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ABSTRACT
The trend toward increased quality of military recruits over the
past decade is projected to continue into the 1990s. The effect of this
trend, combined with the planned force drawdown, may limit oppor-
tunities for the nation's disadvantaged youth to serve in the military. A
policy analysis was conducted using five previous studies of Project
100,000 to determine the feasibility of recruiting disadvantaged youth
for military service. Project 100,000 (1966-1971) relaxed the mili-
tary's entrance standards so that a large number of individuals who
would have otherwise been disquah•ied could serve. The five previous
studies were beset by numerous methodological weaknesses and pro-
duced conflicting results. Consequently, no definitive conclusion could
be drawn regarding the merits of recruiting disadvantaged youth in
the years ahead. Alternative approaches for further research are
presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The anticipated military force reduction, with increased emphasis on
recruiting higher-quality personnel in the 1990s, may severely reduce the
opportunity for disadvantaged youthI to serve in the military.
a. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to evaluate whether manpower pro-
curement policy should stress recruitment of disadvantaged youth for
military service, given that the force will be smaller and the demand for
quality personnel higher. To aid in the decision-making process. this
study reviews and analyzes information regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of such a policy and provides a recommendation for action
based on the needs of the military services, the individual, and society.
C. TIMELINESS AND RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY
A broad spectrum of factors is considered when planning any mili-
tary manpower policy including both military and nonmilitary concerns.
So. too, must a decision to enlist disadvantaged youth consider a full
spectrum of factors. The greatest pressure to accept low-aptitude recruits
comes in times when the supply of higher-aptitude.
1
"Youth." for the purpose of this study, refers to males aged 16-24;
"-disadvantaged' refers to low achievers, as measured by military aptitude
testing, from low-income, "poverty-level" families.
I
higher-education-level recruits is insufficient to fill manpower require-
ments (especially in tinies of war) and when the general recruiting envi-
ronment is poor (Eitelberg, et al., 1984, pp. 39-41). During a recruiting
"boom," as in the mid- and late-1980s environment, the military is able
to rely on high-aptitude high-school graduates to fill manpower needs,
resulting in a lost opportunity for disadvantaged youth who are under-
represented in this category (Laurence, et al., 1985, p. 1). Why should
this be of concern to anyone?
A policy of recruiting disadvantaged youth is appealing because it is
believed that the nation receives the benefit of "triple duty dollars: the
individual finds upward mobility, the military gets needed manpower.
and the nation accomplishes a valuable social welfare activityt" (Sticht.
1990. p. 4) Many believe that the military offers a -second chance" for
disadvantaged youth who have not had access to adequate schools. (Yar-
molinsky. 1971, p. 324) Although difficult to measure, it appears that the
military may assist disadvantaged youth, not only through specialized
training but more importantly through the influence of the military as a
social organization (Yarmolinsky, 1971, p. 325). Therefore, the military is
often thought of as one "way out" of poverty for these individuals. Shut-
ting the door on disadvantaged youth may affect not only these individu-
als but society as a whole.
In the current, highly competitive global marketplace, high produc-
tivity of the nation's citizens is essential to its ability to survive economi-
cally. Now, with the quality of schools in decline, and with cuts in federal
education and training programs, it may be that the military is a key
2
organization that can provide work experience, discipline, and training to
a whole segment of society whose only other alternatives may be welfare.
crime, unemployment, or a lifetime of labor in menial Jobs. Still, any mili-
tary manpower policy must have as its primary concern that it enables
the armed services to meet their mission of national defense.
Recent worldwide changes affecting U.S. security have led military
planners to begin a reassessment of national defense strategy (Cheney.
1990, p. 1). Included in this reassessment will be a new determination of
manpower requirements and composition; specific decisions about qual-
ity will necessitate a study of the benefits and costs associated with the
enlistment of disadvantaged youth. This information will aid the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) in Justifying its policies to government officials
and the general public, since the threat of "lost opportunity" for dis-
advantaged youth has already gained media and political attention. This
is evidenced by front-page exposure In newspapers such as 'The New
York Tirnes (Applebome, 1990). the Boston Globe ("Thinning Military
Ranks." 1990). the ChLcago Trbune (Garza, 1990). and USA Today (Stone,
1990) as well as television news features such as on the Cable News Net-
work (CNN. 29 April 1990). To illustrate this point, two excerpts are pro-
vided below. The first excerpt is from The New York Times:
Mr. Powell, a high school graduate who has twice failed the test
to qualify for enlistment in the Army, is among the thousands of
young people caught in the middle as the military services cut back
on personnel and raise standards for admission...
The Army's increasing selectivity is bringing with it a vexing
social question: What does the nation lose if the military no longer
serves as a channel for upward mobility for those at the bottom of
the social ladder, especially members of minority groups?...
3
"What's happening is nut an Army problem but a national one."
says Lawrence Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manpower, histallations and Logistics... "Throughout our history.
the military has furnished upward mobility. Since the early 1970s,
blacks have really found a home there. If that diminishes, then the
Army doesn't have a problem. but society does."...
The rising standards apply across the board, but they seem to
be having the greatest effect in poorer areas...
"I think it's going to become a big issue in the future, because
it's tough now, and I'm looking for the scores to go even higher."
(says Sgt Jones, station commander in largely black Atlanta). "You
already hear parents say, 'I remember during Vietnam you could go
in if you scored a 16 on the test and now you have to score a 50?'"
[Applebome in New York Ttmes, 1990. pp. Al, D121
The second excerpt is from USA Today:.
... for thousands (of potential recruits)...the thawing of East-West
relations may leave them out in the cold. Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney plans to whittle down the 2.1 million-person armed forces in
the next four years.
"Appalachia and inner cities in the South that do not have educa-
tional opportunities are going to be left out,* says Gene LaRocque of
the Center for Defense Information...
..As of Jan. 1, no service will accept high school dropouts or those
with equivalency diplomas... That could be a mighty blow to many
across the southeast...
"It's going to be a hardship,* says.. .an Army recruiter on Knoxville's
mostly black east side. For many in that poor area. the military is a
crucial escape route from the violent streets...
"The military is one of the best career options here," says Anderson
County vocational counselor Wilma Curtis. Without it. many young
people "would have to go to odd Jobs like trimming trees, hauling
wood, selling corn along the roadside."...
"I really worry about the students without enough skills" to make
the military grade. she says. (Stone in USA Tbday, 1990)
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D. APPROACH
This study is a policy analysis that uses a case study of Project
100.000 (Chapters mI and IV) to answer three research questions, stated
below in sections E and F. Project 100,000 was a program that supported
a policy of recruiting disadvantaged youth. Under Project 100,000. a por-
tion of men who would not qualify for military service under previous
aptitude or medical standards were drafted or accepted as volunteers
(Heisey. Means, and Laurence, 1985. p. 6). A more detailed description of
Project 100,000 is provided in Chapter IV. Five studies of Project 100,000
will be used as the basis for examining the program. These studies
include: (1) DoD (1969): (2) Beusse (1974): (3) Sticht. Armstrong, Hickey
and Caylor (1987): (4) Ramsberger and Means (1987); and (5) Laurence.
Ramsberger. and Gribben (1989). The research questions and issues are
described next.
E. PRIMARY RESEARCH qUESTIONS
1. Does the military benefit by the inclusion of disadvantaged youth.
based on the measurement of accession goals (*numbers"). military
performance, retention, and mobilization practice/experience?
2. Does the individual, and thus society, benefit, based on measures
such as reenlistment, or civilian "success" measures (such as
employment, educational attainment, income. etc.)?
F. SECONDARY RESEARCH ISSUES
1. Has research that measured the benefits and detriments of disad-
vantaged youth in the military been adequate to draw a definitive
conclusion regarding an accession policy? Were experimental con-
trols sufficient so that the data can be considered conclusive? Were
the methods flawed in any critical way that might provide mislead-
ing conclusions?
5
2. If prior research finds that disadvantaged youth do not benefit the
military or the individual, can one conclude that this negative result
is due to inherent chb racteristics of disadvantaged youth or the
military organization, or to interaction of the two? Could there be
other confounding factors that invalidate the results?
G. INFORMATION SOURCES
This study uses current news. government-funded research, profes-
sional journals. books written by active and former government officials,
and textbooks for historical background. The case analysis focuses on
five major studies on Project 100,000 (outlined above). Data from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) were also used to provide trends
in aptitude test scores of recruits and examinees.
6
IL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
This clhapter reviews some of the many issues that must be consid-
ered when making mliitary manpower policy decisions. Because this
analysis is targeted specifically toward a policy of recruiting disadvan-
taged youth, relevant background information helps set the stage for the
examnation of Project 100,000 in Chapters III and IV. This information
includes: how the nilitary defines and measures personnel quality, his-
torIcal trends in recruit quality, and a brief history of disadvantaged
youth in the military. In addition, a literature review on the subject of
force quality is presented to provide a brief look at "both sides" of the
quality issue and to explain the current trend toward a higher-quality
force.
Manpower policy is complex and controversial, mainly due to the
many factors that need to be taken into account- military effectiveness is
one factor, but a number of economic, social, political, and equity consid-
erations also must be evaluated (Cooper, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 155). It is
helpful to group these factors into two basic categories: military (or
national security) and nonmilitary concerns (such as cost, equity, and
social/political considerations) (Cooper, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 155).
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B. MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES: MI LTARY (NATIONAL
SECURITY) CONCERNS
I. Department of Defense (DoD) Mission
According to the DoD mission statement, "The Department of
Defense (DoD) exists to secure the nations survival and independence
against hostile powers that threaten oar way of life." (Laurence, et al.,
1989, p. 1) To prepare for this mission. strategy is developed that encom-
passes threat and policy.
2. MannIng the Force
Force objectives are developed to provide ships, aircraft, weapon
systems, manpower, and support over a period of time with due consid-
eration of the total cost to the nation. Funds are budgeted to obtain the
forces and weapon systems within the limits provided by Congress. This
is accomplished through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) (Navy Education and Training Command, 1981, pp. 4-5)
Every year, DoD issues a statement of manpower requirements that
result from the assessment of the roles and missions of the services
under a variety of wartime scenarios, at one extreme, as well as an
assessment of the workload associated with specific tasks (e.g.. firing a
tank) at the other (White and Hosek. in Scowcroft, 1982. p. 51). The
planning process mixes the top-down and bottom-up approaches (White
and Hosek. in Scowcroft. 1982, p. 51). The "top-down" approach is
essentially captured in PPBS. The "bottom-up" approach comes from
each of the four services; they conduct detailed analyses on the best way
to man and equip a tank unit, an infantry battalion, a ship, or an air
squadron (White and Hosek, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 52). As a result, the
8
manpower requirements are a mix of considerations, some based on sub-
jective evaluations of how to deal with uncertain situations and others
based on detailed, quantitative "manpower engineering" techniques
(White and Hosek, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 51).
3. The Military Force and Quality
a. Deflning and Meamsring Quality
Manpower planners face a difficult task when dealing with
the issue of quality. A former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power Reserve Affairs and Logistics states, "It is no easy proposition to
articulate what [qualityl we truly want, what we can make do with, and
what differences between the two mean in operational terms." (Pirie, in
American Enterprise Institute, 1980, p. 11) The bottom line in the quality
issue is individual performance, yet how can one quantify the relation-
ship between quality and performance, especially when there are so
many non-measurable factors involved? Even more basic, how can one
measure or define quality? Hunter. a former director of Manpower Pro-
gram Analysis in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Nelson. a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements,
Resources and Analysis, describe this dilemma as follows:
Quality is difficult to define and measure when dealing with any
group of people, and it is no easier with military personnel. Honesty.
integr•ity. morality, commitment, and loyalty are all terms that would
be associated with quality. Moreover, training and leadership, which
are supplied by the service and not the individual. are usually
thought to be critical determinants of the efficiency and dedication
with which individuals perform. The ultimate test of quality for mili-
tary personnel Is their success in combat. In times of peace, mea-
surements of readiness substitutes for this "ultimate test", but
readiness is difficult to measure. Current manpower readiness
9
reporting is not very useful as a test of quality. (Hunter and Nelson,
in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 111)
Since readiness measurement is "not very useful." the following discus-
sion of recruit quality is focused on attributes that are measurable.
As with any employer, the military has a set of entrance
standards for potential recruits. The daily briefing at each Military
Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) explains to military applicants the
purpose of their visit to the MEPS; in order to enlist they must be
screened to make sure they are mentally, physically, and morally
qualified.
b. The Importance Qf Aptitude and Edru .rion
Although these entrance standards are described in three
broad categories- mental, physical. and moral- "recruit quality" is gen-
erally indexed on the basis of the first criterion. "Mental" is really a
measure of aptitude and education, not a measure of intelligence, as the
term might suggest (Laurence. et al.. 1989, p. 2; also see Eitelberg, et al..
1984, pp. 19-20). Extensive research has shown that recruit aptitude
levels are strongly correlated with success in military training and Job
performance (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 2). Education, specifically evi-
denced in the high-school diploma, has been shown by numerous stud-
ies to be the single best predictor of a person's potential for adapting to
military life. Specifically, people who fail to complete high school are
twice as likely as high-school graduates to leave the military before fin-
ishing a first term of enlistment (Eitelberg, et al., 1984. p. 21). Non-high-
school graduates are not automatically disqualified, but they do have to
meet higher aptitude standards and there is a ceiling placed on their
i0
enlistment by Congress (Laurence, et al.. 1989, p. 2). These two
measures- education and aptitude-serve to describe an individual's
potential, rather than actual capability or readiness (Hunter, et al.. in
Scowcroft. 1982, p. 111).
ce Measuring Aptitude: The Armed forces Qual(flcation
Test PIPV7
The American military is a pioneer in the field of aptitude
testing, developing the first large-scale testing program during World
War I (Eitelberg, 1988, p. 20). The Army Alpha (a verbal test) and Army
Beta (a non-verbal test for non-English-speaking, illiterate, or unschooled
draftees) were used to gauge the ability of new entrants and assign them
to jobs (Eitelberg, 1988, p. 20). In World War I. the Army General Classi-
fication Test (AGCT}. which is described as a test of "general learning
ability." largely replaced the tests of World War I (Eitelberg. 1988. p. 22).
Since 1950, potential recruits have been screened on the basis of the
Armed Forces Qualification Teat (AFQT} (Eitelberg. 1988. p. 23). Each
service had its own conversion tables from its own test battery to deter-
mine AFQT until DoD required that all services use a single test battery
both for screening enlistees and for assigning them to occupations
(Eltelberg, et al.. 1984, p. 17). The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB) was chosen for this purpose and was put in use on
January 1. 1976 (Eltelberg, et al., 1984, p. 17).
The AFQT consists of verbal and mathematical subtests
from the ASVAB (Laurence. et al.. 1989, p. 3). AF9T scores are converted
into percentiles and are statistically related to the aptitude score
11
distribution of the general population of youth tested under the 'Profile of
American Youth" in 1980 (Eitelberg, 1988, pp. 100-101). The percentile
scores are divided into five categories. two of which (III and IV) are fur-
ther subdivided, as follows:









Source: Heisey. et al.. Mlitary Performance of Low Aptitude Recruits: Project 100,000 and
the ASVAB Mftnofrrnbl, Human Resources Research Organization. 1985.
d. Setting Minimum Aptitude (AFQ2T Standards
Individuals scoring in AFQT Categories I through lilA, rep-
resenting the upper 50th percentile (or "above average" range), are the
most highly demanded by the services (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 3: also
see Hunter and Nelson. in Scowcroft, 1982. pp. 113-114). Category IV
individuals are enlisted when needed, but there is a Congressionally
mandated ceiling on the total number allowed during any given year
(Yarmolinsky, 1983, p. 77; also see Eitelberg, 1984. p. 22). For example,
in Fiscal Year (FW) 1981, Congress. in the year's Defense Appropriation
Authorization, limited total DoD CAT IV accessions to 25 percent of the
total enlisted accessions (and the Army could recruit no less than
65 percent high-school diploma graduates) (Hunter and Nelson. in
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Scowcroft, 1982, p. 116). For FY 1982. no service could recruit more
than 25 percent CAT IVs, and by FY 1983 no more than 20 percent
(Hunter and Nelson, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 116). Category V individuals
are ineligible to enlist by law (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 3).
What the services want is one thing, and what they are able
to get from the civilianr population is another. Although the services
prefer the manpower pool of Categories 1-11A. the ability to meet recruit-
Ing goals depends on several external factors, such as the available labor
market, the political climate (especially as It relates to attitudes toward
defense), current economic conditions (especially unemployment figures),
and internal factors, such as required endstrength, military compensa-
tion packages, recruiting budgets, and other means to attract high-
quality personnel (Eitelberg, et al., 1984, p. 22). The point Is, the chang-
ing total environment (external and internal) leads to changes in the
demand for certain types of recruits and, therefore, changing entrance
requirements for military manpower.
As stated by Eltelberg, "The history of the American mill-
tary demonstrates that standards for acceptance are flexible gates that
open and close in reaction to the shifting needs of national defense and
manpower recruitment." (Eltelberg, 1990, p. 2) Each year, the services
set their minimum education and aptitude standards (within the range
allowed by Congress) for determining applicant eligibility, and these lim-
its can be adjusted at any time to respond to changes In the retention
and the recruiting market (Eltelberg. et al., 1984, pp. 21-22). For
example, in the 1980s, the recruiting market was very favorable; in fiscal
13
1988 only five percent of accessions were in the Category IV range and
only seven percent were non-high-school graduates (Laurence. et al.,
1989, pp. 3-4). However. times are not always favorable to recruiting.
and there have been periods when *CAT IVs," as they are now called.
were needed to meet the military's manpower requirements (Eitelberg. et
al., 1984, pp. 24-28; also see Eitelberg, 1990, p. 5).
4. Historical Trends
Because the AFQT has been used to screen military recruits
since the early 1950s, it is possible to compare and evaluate the test
scores of individuals over time and to establish trends (Eitelberg, et al..
1984. p. 31). Military psychologists use the AFQT to study qualitative
trends in military recruiting. despite the fact that the tests used to mea-
sure AFQT have changed several times over the years (Eitelberg. et al..
1984. p. 31). Nevertheless. the most recent norming of the AFQT created
a score distribution that is not too dissimilar from the score distribution
used during the 30-year period since the introduction of the test, and all
scores are approximately representative of their relative position within
the population distribution of the time. It is thus possible to discuss apti-
tude trends over the past 40 years during which the AFQT was used
(Eitelberg. 1988, pp. 101-105).
AFQT scores have changed over the years. In Table 1. the per-
centage of male examinees who achieved an AFQT percentile score of 50
or better is displayed for each year from 1964 to 1990 by service. An
"examinee" is a person who has been tested for military service:
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TABLE 1
PERCENT OF MALE EZXAMINERS WHO ACHIEVED AF97
PERCENTILE SCORES OF 50 OR HIGHER (CATEGORIES I-liA)
FOR ALL SERVICES COMBINED, FY 1964-JUNE 1990
Percent who Scored AFQT 50 or Higherl





























Sources: Data for Years 1964- 1983 are from Eltelberg, et al.. Screening for Service,
p. 33. Data for years 1984-1990 were provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
IPercentages are according to the Armed Service that tested the examinee. Examinees
Include only males without prior military service who were tested for the purpose of
enlistment or Induction.
2 The official end of the draft occurred on 30 June 1973. The drawdown began in July
1972. with the last draft call issued in December 1972.
31990 includes 1 October 1989 through 30 June 1990.
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physically, morally, and "mentally" (aptitude and education level) (Eitel-
berg, et al., 1984, p. 31). An examinee may or may not be found qualified
for service, and even if qualified, does not necessarily enlist; therefore,
examinees are not necessarily accessions (Eitelberg, et al., 1984, p. 31).
The AFQT percentile score of 50 (the median of the reference population)
is often used as the dividing line of aptitude quality by the services
(Eitelberg. et al., 1984, p. 32). For administrative and reporting purposes,
the military services also divide AFQT Category III into two parts: AFQT
Category lilA (percentile scores from 50 to 64) and AFQT Category IIB
(percentile scores from 31 to 49) (Eitelberg, et al., 1984, p. 32). In this
way, those who score in AFQT Categories I-lilA (especially high-school
graduates) can be viewed as the *top half" of the population which is
considered to be the "high quality" group (Eitelberg, et al., 1984, p. 32).
a. Male Examinee=
Table 1 shows that the annual percentage of male exami-
nees scoring in the upper half of the distribution is generally increasing.
with the highest percentage in the first six months of 1990. Comparing
the Vietnam-era draft years to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) years, it can
be seen from Table 1 that during the Vietnam draft era, the percentiles
ranged from 41.9 to 51.0. After the Vietnam-era draft, the percentage
who had an AFQT score of 50 or higher gradually declined to under 40
percent (years 1973-1981), but as the AVF policy matured in the 1980s,
the percentage increased to over 50 percent.
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b. Mate Recruits
Table 2 displays the percent distribution of male recruits
(all services combined) by AFQT Category for each year from 1952 to
30 June 1990 by all services combined. The recent trend toward higher-
quality recruits is evident by the dramatic decline in the category IV col-
umn. Also worth noting is the "dip' in quality during 1984-1985, which
may mirror the declining civilian unemployment at the time (Warner,
1990, p. 52). At the same time, the decline In high-quality enlistments in
1988 may reflect a tightening civilian labor market (Warner. 1990, p. 52).
Figure 1 Is a graphic depiction of the percent of male
recruits in AFQT Categories I-TV from 1964 to 1990. Relevant world
events, specifically the Korean conflict in the early 1950s and the Viet-
nam conflict and Project 100,000 In the late 1960s. are responsible for
the increased Category IV recruitment shown during those periods. The
ASVAB misnorming (described below) creates the increased Category IV
recruitment during the late 1970s.
c. Briqf BHitory qf CAT lVs in the Military
Although not the first choice of the military, CAT IVs are
accepted into service when manpower requirements make it necessary.
As expected. in times of war or "conflict," the demand for CAT TVs is the
highest (Eitelberg, 1990, p. 7). "The enlistment practices regarding indi-
viduals in Category IV suggest that unless these men were needed
because of a supply shortage, the services have preferred to exclude
them." (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, p. 5) In the First World War, the
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TABLE 2
PERCN DISTRIBUTION OF MALE RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES
COMBINED) BY MQT CATEGORY, FY 1952-JUNE 1990
Percent Distribution qf Male Recruits1
Fiscal Category Category Category Category
Year I I II IV Total2
1952 1.4 22.0 32.3 39.2 100.0
1953 7.2 24.1 31.5 37.2 100.0
1954 8.2 25.3 36.9 29.6 100.0
1955 7.8 25.3 38.1 28.8 100.0
1956 7.1 25.9 40.2 26.8 100.0
1957 7.8 25.2 42.8 24.2 100.0
1958 8.7 26.2 47.1 18.0 100.0
1959 9.1 27.8 47.7 15.4 100.0
1960 8.2 26.9 51.3 13.6 100.0
1961 6.1 31.3 49.7 12.9 100.0
1962 6.2 31.8 45.7 16.3 100.0
1963 6.0 32.5 47.8 13.7 100.0
1964 6.3 32.1 47.1 14.5 100.0
1965 5.5 31.3 48.8 14.4 100.0
1966 6.4 33.5 43.5 16.6 100.0
1967 6.6 33.1 38.7 21.6 100.0
1968 6.0 31.8 37.6 24.6 100.0
1969 6.2 31.7 37.7 24.4 100.0
1970 5.3 30.5 41.0 23.2 100.0
1971 5.1 30.0 43.1 21.8 100.0
1972 4.2 30.2 48.1 17.5 100.0
All-Volunteer ForceTransition
1973 3.7 30.1 52.1 14.2 100.0
1974 3.0 32.3 54.5 10.2 100.0
1975 3.5 34.0 56.3 6.1 100.0
1976 3.9 33.9 51.7 10.5 100.0
1977 4.3 28.2 39.6 27.9 100.0
1978 3.6 27.3 42.1 27.0 100.0
1979 3.0 23.6 41.8 31.6 100.0




PERCENT DISTRUTION OF MALE RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES
COMI 'NED) BY AFUT CATEGORY. FY 1952-JUNE 1990
Percent D/str/but/on qf Male Recruitsl
Fiscal Category Category Category Category
Year I 11 11 IV Toral 2
1982 3.1 33.4 49.4 14.1 100.0
1983 3.7 36.7 50.1 9.5 100.0
1984 5.9 30.9 52.7 10.5 100.0
1985 4.9 32.7 54.4 8.0 100.0
1986 3.9 33.9 57.3 4.9 100.0
1987 4.8 36.2 54.6 4.4 100.0
1988 4.7 36.8 54.1 4.4 100.0
1989 4.3 35.4 54.0 6.3 100.0
19904 4.5 36.3 56.2 3.0 100.0
Sources: Data for years 1952-1983 are from Eftelberg. et al.. Screening for Service,
p. 40. Data for years 1984-1990 were provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
IMale recruits Include individuals without prior military service who were inducted or
enlisted and entered active duty (all services combined) during the indicated fiscal year.
2Row totals may not equal 100 due to roumding.
3 The official end of the draft occurred on 30 June 1973. The drawdown began in 1972,
with the last draft call issued in December 1972.
41990 includes 1 October 1989 through 30 June 1990.
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Army established Development Battalions to train and assimilate men
who had physical, mental, or moral limitations that were considered to
be remediable (Eitelberg, 1990, p. 7). In World War I1, aptitude restric-
tions were lowered, which allowed about 10 percent induction of illiter-
ates (Eitelberg, 1990. p. 7 ). Of note, the Army enlisted more than
300,000 illiterate or semiliterate men. 85 percent of whom graduated
from special training programs for assimilation in Army units (Eitelberg.
1990. p. 7). The AFQT minimum percentile scores were again reduced for
the Korean Conflict, providing entrance for Category IV individuals (Eitel-
berg, 1984, p. 25). The trend for the period between Korea and Vietnam
was to gradually raise the caliber of new recruits by reducing the per-
centage of CAT IVs the services were required to take (Eitelberg, 1984,
p. 25). As the Cold War intensified in the early 1960s. expansion of the
military was again sought, resulting in a slight lowering of standards
(Eitelberg, 1984, p. 26). During the Vietnam conflict, aptitude and
education standards were lowered four times, and all services except the
Air Force loosened their formal requirements for volunteers (Eitelberg,
1984. p. 26). A significant event during this period was the estpblishnment
of Project 100,000. a program to induct substantial numbers of margin-
ally literate men into active military duty (covered in detail in Chapters III
and IV). Many low-aptitude recruits were admitted to the military
between January 1976 and September 1980 as a result of the 01SVAB
Misnorming" (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 7). The timing of this incident
was unusual because it did not occur during war or conflict, an one
would expect, but rather during peacetime. However, the ASVAB
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misnorming was not planned; it was *an unintended by-product of a mis-
calibration of the ASVAB." described below (Laurence, et al., 1989. p. 7).
Updated forms of the ASVAB were developed for DoD-wide
use In 1976, but there were flaws in the method of determining appropri-
ate percentile scores from the norming population. These flaws went
undetected (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 8). One result of these errors was
that scores in the lower ability range were inflated; therefore, many
recruits who were thought to be of average aptitude were actually below
average or Category lWs (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 8). If these errors had
not been made. many of these Individuals would not have qualified for
enlistment and therefore were subsequently designated as "Potentially
Ineligibles* (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 8). By the time the errors were
found, verified, and corrected, almost 360,000 "Potentially Ineligibles"
had erlisted in the military (Eitelberg, 1988, p. 173).
5. The Debate About the Need for High-Quality Entlstees
Manning the force is not just a question of recruiting a required
number of people. Military personnel must be capable of succeeding in
the tasks the armed forces perform to achieve their missions. Other
things being equal, the military should prefer to recruit those who
demonstrate the knowledge and propensity for learning essential skills
(Home, 1987, p. 443). The question is, although the AFQT score accu-
rately predicts military performance in theory, is It an accurate predictor
in practice (Home, 1987, p. 443)?
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs,
and Logistics) directed the Military Services to establish a research and
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development program to link enlistment standards to job performance
(DoD, 1990, p. iI). The Joint-Service Job Performance Measurement
(JPM)/Enlistment Standards Project, as of January 1990, concluded that
the services have developed reliable measures of job performance and
that the AFQT is a valid predictor of first-term Job performance. However,
this is not the final word, because this research effort is in its infancy.
Further linkage-modeling will be completed in 1992 (DoD, 1990, pp. 4-1-
4-2). In the modern age of technology, are Category IV personnel able to
perform successfully? As already shown, the current trend in recruiting
is toward more high-quality personnel. Why is there a recent trend
toward higher quality?
As weapons become more sophisticated, the aptitudes of wea-
pon operators become an object of great concern to military planners
(Yarmolinsky, 1983. p. 73). It appears that technological advances in the
armed forces have produced many military systems that are complex.
unreliable, and difficult to maintain (Binkin. 1986. p. 53). If this is true,
the the military's need for highly skilled specialists and technicians to
operate and maintain these systems is bound to increase (Binkin. 1986,
p. 53). However, there is no consensus of opinion on this point. Another
view is that emerging technologies will result in more reliable systems
that are easier to maintain, thus requiring a reduction in the number
and skill levels of personnel. These issues are discussed below.
Prior to 1983, one Army study demonstrated that more than
one-fifth of the tank gunners serving in Germany (and more than 25 per-
cent in the United States) in the late 1970s did not understand the
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procedure for aiming their battlesights (Yarmolinsky, 1983. p. 73). Sol-
diers in Categories IIl and IV often have dtfficulty understanding instruc-
tion manuals and, as the study points out, are therefore unable to oper-
ate sophisticated components of the Army's air defense systems or even
some basic individual weapons (such as the Redeye or Stinger missile)
(Yarmollnsky, 1983, p. 73). Soldiers were often not able to recall the
firing sequence for the Redeye. nor were they able to differentiate
between friendly and enemy aircraft (Yarmolinsky, 1983. p. 73). These
results were found despite the fact that a "high percentage" of Redeye
crews were from Category Ill rather than Category IV (Yarmollnsky. 1983.
p. 73).
The Stinger. which replaced the Redeye. has a better infrared
guidance system, matching airframe and propulsion improvements, and
the addition of an identification-friend-or-foe (1FF) system (Binkln. 1986,
pp. 65-66). These improvements, however, added to the weapon's com-
plexity. A senior Army officer explained:
The gunner has to complete an 18-step sequence. some of which is
quite complex, and he must make many crucial decisions along the
way. First, he has to decide whether or not the aircraft is hostile,
then he has to run through a complicated set of inbound and out-
bound range rings to determine the correct distance, and remember
the sequence order. We worried that under the pressures of combat,
he would forget some and miss. (Binkin, 1986, p. 66)
An Army study in 1983 found that operators who scored above
the 50th percentile on the AFQT met desired performance levels in about
50 percent of the test scenarios. those who scored below the 50th per-
centile met desired performance levels in none of the scenarios (Binkin,
1986, p. 67).
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A more recent study by Scribner. Smith. Baldwin, and Phillips
(1986). "Are Smarter Tankers Better?, AFQT and Military Productivity,"
reported similar findings. Based on M-1 and M-60 tank firing scores
linked to characteristics of individual crew members, it was found that
tanks with "smarter" (higher AF9T percentile categories) gunners and
tank commanders performed substantially better (Scribner. et al., 1986,
p. 201). Of note, the newer M-1 tank, which has greatly improved the
ability of crews to hit the target, acted as a partial equalizer for low-
aptitude crews; however, since the M- 1 may be damaged in battle,
degrading Its fighting capability, this result should be viewed with
caution (Scribner, et al.. 1986. pp. 201-202).
A study by David K. Home (1987). entitled 'The Impact of Sol-
dier Quality On Army Performance." obtained results consistent with
Scrlbner. Smith. Baldwin. and Phillips. His primary interest was the rela-
tionship between AFQT scores and performance measures (Home, 1987,
p. 443). Two performance measures were evaluated: the first source was
composed of scores on various tests from the Army's training schools,
and the second source was the Skill Qualifications Test (SQ'r. Home
concluded:
... that AFQT- a measure of trainability- is a significant predictor of
performance in the Army. Although the performance and skill mea-
sures used in this study are not perfect, the consistency of the
relationship across types of performance measures and across
MOS's [Military Occupational Specialties] Is impressive...
The results also suggest that the Army may be able to use the
differential impact of AFQT scores across occupational specialties for
allocating manpower. Other factors constant. high-AFQ' soldiers are
more efficiently allocated to those MOS's where AFQT score has a
greater impact on performance. Both the SQT and training data
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illustrate variations in the impact of AFQT score across MOS's. Man-
power allocation also depends on the critical nature of the specialty.
In some MOS's. for example. even small increases in performance
may be cost effective. However, in many situations, manpower allo-
cation might be carried out utilizing the contribution of AFQT score
to performance. (Home. 1973, p. 455)
Not everyone would agree with the need for a high-quality force
in the face of sophisticated technology. Roger W. Little, for example,
notes the following:
One...assumption is that more rigid entry standards are necessary
in order to satisfy the higher technological requirements of modern
military organization. However, the assumption of the necessity for
increased aptitudes for technical skills does not apply to all posi-
tions in the armed forces or even to a major fraction of them. It Is
plausible to assume that the requirements for training wheeled-
vehicle mechanics. military police, medical aid men. and clerks, as
well as basic infantry men and seamen, have not changed as mark-
edly as for the often mentioned but less frequently trained electron-
ics technicians. More complex technology does not involve a
corresponding increase in more highly trained personnel. Trends in
industry suggest that job titles are often upgraded while the actual
skill levels are reduced. This also occurs in the military organization
because the operator skills are increasingly built into the design of
complex weaponry. Requirements for operator skills are thus trans-
ferred to the repair and maintenance level. Even there, however, the
designed complexity of weaponry is such that a defective component
is more efficiently replaced than repaired, thus actually permitting a
reduced skill. (Little, 1969, pp. 193-194)
Jurn Toomepuu provides further insight into the quality issue.
He used M-1 vs. M-60 tank performance studies to point out that the
technological advances of systems, such as the M-1, have not resulted in
a net decrease in the complexity of the total tank system or in the
increasingly greater need for highly trainable personnel. In fact, though
making the tank easier to operate, the advanced technology has greatly
increased the size and cost of its associated logistics and support
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requirements. This argument of course is not limited to the M- I tank but
applies to many modern weapons systems. (Toomepuu. 1985, p. 9)
Toomepuu's concern is that advanced technology and higher
performance do not necessarily translate into improved combat effective-
ness (Toomepuu, 1985, p. 9). The distinction between effectiveness and
performance is that the first term refers to the impact of a weapon on the
outcome of the battle, whereas the latter term describes the degree of
accomplishment of a particular capability of a system, such as rate of
fire, speed of movement, etc. (Toomepuu, 1985, p. 9).
"The Army 21 project," which attempts to visualize the Army
and its hardware and personnel requirements 20 years from now, con-
cludes that the soldier of the future must be able to make rapid. inde-
pendent decisions, be more highly educated, have an expert level of
technological understanding, and be multi-capable-- besides being a
fighter fToomepuu. 1985. p. 11). One obstacle in justifying the high cost
of high-quality personnel is that there is an emphasis on hardware
spending over programs that provide the needed manpower quality.
Toomepuu feels this oversight is due to a lack of integration of human
factors into weapons systems research and development as well as into
weapons effectiveness measures, combat models, and PPBS (Toomepuu.
1985, p. 9).
The above discussions center on the use of 'high-tech" wea-
ponry and equipment. What about low-skill occupations? Can CAT IVs be
used effectively in certain jobs? Ramsberger and Means (1987) studied
the performance of low-aptitude recruits using data from the ASVAB
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Misnorming Period (described above). Some results of this study are
relevant here. For example, researchers found that the performance of
low-aptitude personnel (Category IV) was not significantly different from
that of the lowest fully qualified personnel at the time (Ramsberger and
Means, 1987, P. 95). The attrlt_,-o ztCAT Ws was very similar to that of
the control group, but there were major differences between high-school
and non-high-school griduates: The non-high-school graduates who
were admitted under the misnorming had higher attrition rates and lower
promotion and eligibility rates (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, p. 95).
Concerning aptitude and job complexity, Ramsberger and
Means reported "The hypothesis was that individuals with lower aptitude
and educational qualifications would perform just as well as others when
their Job demands did not exceed their capabilities." Therefore, it was
expected that the low-aptitude individuals would perform well in low-
complexity occupations but would perform less well in more-complex
Jobs (Ramsberger and Means, 1987. p. 98). The hypothesis was not sup-
ported: performance (as measured by attrition, promotion, and reenlist-
ment eligibility rates) was better in medium-complexity occupations than
in low-complexity jobs. Usually, the high-complexity occupations showed
lower rates of attrition, and personnel in these jobs were promoted and
judged reenlistment-eligible at higher rates than their peers In lower-
complexity Jobs (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, p. 98). There were
indications that low-aptitude individuals were at a disadvantage in more-
complex occupations, however, overall, the findings argued for consider-
ing job-related motivational factors to be more Important than aptitude
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level in determining performance (Ramsberger and Means. 1987, p. 100).
This point is discussed further in Chapters IV and V.
Ramsberger and Means conclude that a modest reduction in a
service's aptitude requirement would not significantly affect performance
levels as measured by attrition, promotion, and reenlistment rates. The
conditions under which this is done (war vs. peacetime), however, may
affect the outcome (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, p. 100).
6. Are There Methods to Improve the Performance of Low-
Aptitude Individuals?
In Cast.Off Youth. Sticht. et al. describe four strategies that the
military has used to cope with the strain on the training system caused
by mobilization and enlistment of low-aptitude recruits. These "accom-
modation strategies" are methods to help "set up" low-aptitude personnel
to be able to perform their duties. They follow the "principle of least
effort" and are described below, in the order of least to most difficult to
implement. (Sticht. et al.. 1987, p. 86)
a. UmLted Assignment
The point of this strategy is that low-aptitude personnel are
assigned a limited set of Jobs, thought to match their general or special
aptitudes. These Jobs may require limited or no technical training, so
that recruits can often enter them directly after basic training. (Sticht, et
al.. 1987, p. 87)
Although it seems logical that placing low-aptitude person-
nel in low- skill-level Jobs is a way to increase their chances of success in
performance. this approach does not necessarily work. Another
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implication from the study by Ramsberger and Means (1987) on the
ASVAB Misnorming episode was that channeling low-aptitude personnel
into the low-skilled Jobs does not circumvent training and performance
problems. This is not because these individuals are not capable of per-
forming these Jobs but rather because they are viewed as low status.
dead-end Jobs. (Ramsberger and Means. 1987, p. 101)
b. Extra Help and Time
Individuals. including low-aptitude recruits assigned to a
technical training program, often receive extra help from instructors and
other students. Low-aptitude trainees may also receive extra time to com-
plete a course, or they may be recycled through part or all of the course
after they complete it. (Sticht, et al., 1987, p. 88)
c. Rev/ison Qf Training Courses
Courses can be rewritten to make them more understand-
able ("learnable"). Some methods include developing a learning system
that uses what the individual already knows as a basis for other training,
identifying precise requirements of the course and Jobs, and concentrat-
ing on the portion which is the most difficult for Category WVs. Other
techniques include integrating literacy training into the skill training or
for off-duty hours, relating learning situations and materials directly to
the military, and developing specific course terminal objectives that are
job-relevant. (Sticht, et al., 1987. p. 88)
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d. Special Training Units
Remedial literacy training is provided in Special Training
units; low-aptitude individuals would be removed from the mainstream of
military training for literacy training. (Sticht, et al., 1987, p. 88)
Two examples of this type of assistance are Functional
Applied Skills Training (FAST) and Job-Oriented Basic Skills (JOBS), two
remedial training programs currently provided by the U.S. Navy. One
program is designed for general literacy, to help in boot camp completion.
while the second program is designed to help low-aptitude recruits qual-
ify for WAW schools and thus have the opportunity to serve in more techni-
cal ratings. A descrlption and a report on their effectiveness follow:
(1) FAST. FAST was developed to help those Identified
with reading deficiencies in completing the academic challenges of boot
camp. This goal has been achieved; there has been a 100 percent boot
camp graduation rate among FAST-educated recruits over the past five
years (Spendley. 1990, p. 5). Furthermore, recent research conducted by
Spendley found that FAST-educated Category IIIB and IVA sailors signifi-
cantly increased their probability of advancing to E-4 within the first
three years of enlistment, compared to the rate of advancement of non-
FAST-educated Category III and IVs (Spendley, 1990, p. iii).
(2) JOBS. The JOBS program Is for those whose ASVAB
scores are below the minimum required for entry into selected Navy Class
"A" technical schools. These courses were designed to increase the indi-
vidual's skill and knowledge level needed as a prerequisite for success in
"A7 Schools (Baker and Hamovltch, 1983, Report Documentation Page). A
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study by Baker and Hamovitch compared personnel who were sent to
JOBS training, some on the direct track (immediately after recruit train-
ing) and some in the delayed track (after apprenticeship training and
time spent in the fleet) to the following respective control groups: (1) indi-
viduals who were JOBS eligible, but did not attend, (2) "A" school quali-
fied students who attended "AW school at the same time as the JOBS stu-
dents who were direct track (MA" school after recruit training), and (3) "A"
school-qualified students who attended "A school at the same time as
the JOBS students delayed track. Baker and Hamovitch list the following
findings:
1. Demographic data collected showed that JOBS included twice as
many minority groups as did the "A" school groups.
2. The mean AFQT score of the "A" school-qualified group was
approximately 29 points higher than that of the JOBS group,
although approximately 20 percent more of the JOBS group
received high school diplomas.
3. Of the 1,551 JOBS-qualified students who have attended JOBS
school, 1,493 (96%) have graduated and 58 (4%) have attrlted.
The majority of attrites were for disciplinary reasons.
4. The JOBS delayed-track group had a significantly higher num-
ber of attrites from JOBS school than did the JOBS direct-track
group.
5. Of the 1,493 JOBS graduates, "A" school data are available for
1,256. Of these, 996 (79%) have graduated and 260 (21%) have
attrlted. Comparable figures for the "A" school comparison group
are 90 and 10 percent.
6. On six of the seven job performance criteria (all but the military
bearing and conduct criterion), the "A" school group received
slightly higher mean ratings than did the JOBS group.
7. Thirty-three months after the JOBS and "A" school comparison
group had graduated from "AW school, the "A" school group had
over twice as many fleet discharges as did the JOBS group, thus
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reducing the total loss rate between the two groups to only 3
percent. (Baker and Hamovitch. 1983, pp. vil-vili)
This study suggests that Category IV personnel unay be
able to attend "A" school and succeed in technical ratings if they are
given extra training (such as JOBS). This can provide increased flexibility
in the assignment of such personnel and in their chances for upward
mobility. A cost benefit analysis should be conducted to assess the
feasibility of such a program.
e. Leadership and Motivation
Since the performance of low-aptitude men Is a key issue in
this analysis, it is important to discuss leadership and motivation, which
play a major role in performance. It has already been pointed out that the
low-aptitude men placed in low-skill occupations during the ASVAB M/s-
norming probably did not perform to their potential due to a lack of moti-
vation (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, p. 101). This is very important for
leaders to understand, because leaders must channel people's motivation
in order to achieve the organization's mission (Stoner and Freeman,
1989, p. 452). There are several theories of motivation, two of which are
relevant to this analysis and will be briefly described below.
Expectancy theory, with roots in industrial/organizational
psychology, has been the prominent motivation theory in that field in
recent years (Muchinsky. 1989. p. 463). The expectancy model bases
motivation, performance, and satisfaction on what the individual expects
from the proposed performance. how much effort the individual expects
the proposed performance will require, and the valence, or value, the
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anticipated rewards have for the individual (Stoner and Freeman, 1989,
p. 452). According to expectancy theory.
Each person is assume.d to be a rational decision maiker who will
expend effort on activities that lead to desired rewards. Individuals
are thought to know what they want from work and understand that
their performance will determine whether they get the rewards they
desire. (Muchinsky, 1989. p. 463)
Equity theory includes the effects of peers on an individual,
implying that an individual's motivation, performance. and satisfaction
depend on the individual's comparison of his or her contributions and
rewards with those of others in similar situations. (Stoner and Freeman,
1989. pp. 452-453)
The military is perceived by many as an expert organization
in the role of leadership. so it appears that a criticism of its leadership
methods would not apply. However, it may be that the system of rewards
in the military is geared toward high-quality personnel. For example, they
qualify for more exciting jobs that they can associate with the service's
mission, they often receive reenlistment bonuses, and they may be
shown a special respect and recognition for their technical expertise so
they feel like they are an "Important part of the team." Even high-quality
personnel who serve in low-skill occupations could be at an advantage
because they may view this as a temporary means to an end (such as a
short-term enlistment in exchange for a service-sponsored college fund,
or for a chance to travel or achieve another personal goal). Low-aptitude
personnel, on the other hand, may not be told that their Jobs, even
though unglamorous. are still important. As described in the equity
theory, they see how other personnel (high quality) are treated with better
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rewards by the system. It could be that the only time they get attention.
or are noticed, is when they are in trouble, whereas the others are
noticed and recognized for the positive things they do.
Steers and Porter. realizing how critical motivation is to
performance, and thus to success, recommend that leaders take certain
actions to get the best performance from personnel. The recommnenda-
tions that apply to the military environment include: (1) leaders must
actively and intentionally motivate their subordinates; (2) leaders must
recognize that personnel have different motives and abilities: (3) Jobs
should be designed to offer challenges and variety- subordinates must
clearly understand what is expected of them; (4) leaders should stay
close to personnel and remedy problems as they arise; and (5) all per-
sonnel should be included in improving operations- they should be
asked for ideas and suggestions and, if acceptable, allowed to implement
their ideas (Stoner and Freeman, 1989, p. 451). The issue of motivation
is further explored in the Project 100,000 Case Study in Chapter IV.
f. TranMtion to Civilian.L(fe Assistance
Training, such as counseling, education, or vocational
training prior to release from active duty, can aid the veteran in finding
productive employment In post-service life. "Tips" on how to properly fill
out a Job application or resumnt and how to interview for a Job can make
a difference in successfully finding employment. This is especially helpful
to veterans whose first *Job" was the military because they have no
experience in searching for civilian employment.
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As put forth in the preceding sections, manpower require-
ments, from a military perspective, already have a host of concerns in
matching up a calculated number of people (based on strategic require-
ments) of necessary quality levels for each operational and support activ-
ity. However, the declsion-making process does not stop here. The
military establishment does not exist in a vacuum and does not draw
from an unlimited supply of available personnel. Manning the force
becomes a much more complicated Issue; the military exists within a
complex society. Inextricably Interwoven with the nation's economics,
politics and social forces. These issues are covered next.
C. MIITARY MANPOWER ISSUES: NONM1LITARY CONCERNS
1. Economics
The military competes with private industry for its labor supply.
When the economy is strong and unemployment is low, the recruiting
environment is usually poor and the military needs to find incentives to
try to lure potential recruits away from other opportunities. When the
economy is weak, there is an opposite effect: many young people go to
the local recruiting office when other Jobs are not available. Factors that
affect military manpower supply are: population growth, economic sta-
tus, educational advancement, military benefits and compensation, cul-
tural background, and recruiting efficiency. Demand, on the other hand,
is affected by military status, reenlistment and attrition, and technologi-
cal advances. As discussed in Chapter IV. the supply of potential recruits
and demand for manpower affects the military's acceptance standards.
(Eltelberg, 1988. p. 32)
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2. Cost
Cost (or efficiency) is an important criterion for Judging military
manpower procurement policy options. The most preferable policy, of
course, is the one with the lower cost (all other things being equal)
(Cooper, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 156). In reality, the determination of
resource requirements (including manpower) not only includes what the
services think they need in order to meet mission requirements but is
also based on the reality of what they think they can get and on how
much it costs (White and Hosek, in Scowcroft, 1982. p. 52). Attracting
and retaining high-quality personnel is a high-cost operation, so strong
Justification and available funding are required to man the force with
high quality (Hunter and Nelson, In Scowcroft, 1982, p. 116).
Of interest to this policy analysis is the cost of a high-quality
force. The more high-school graduates (high quality) that are recruited,
the higher the first-term retention: therefore, the lower the number of
recruits needed In subsequent years. Fewer recruits means lower recruit-
ing and training costs, but higher retention rates lead to higher salaries
and retirement costs (Hunter and Nelson, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 116). In
a limited budget situation, such as will be faced in the 1990s, manpower
policy makers will have to find a least-cost solution for a force of a given
size, and they must seek to strike a balance between recruit quality.




The equity of various policy alternatives is always an important
criterion. Defining what is precisely fair and what is not is, of course.
impossible (Cooper. in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 156). Nevertheless, society
must regularly make judgments about fairness with respect to a variety
of different issues. The issue is not about whether or not society should
Impose "burdens" on its citizens, because such an imposition is neces-
sary for the needs of the nation (one obvious burden, as Cooper notes,
usually takes place in the form of taxes) (Cooper, in Scowcroft. 1982.
p. 156). Instead, the issue is in trying to distribute these burdens equi-
tably (Cooper. in Scoweroft. 1982. p. 156). Equity is a central concern in
whether or not to include disadvantaged youth in the military.
4. Bochil/PoUtleia
a. Representatienes of tMae Military
As stated by Eitelberg and Binkin:
At the heart of the issue of military representation in this country is
the concept of "citizen-soldier" and the democratic notion of full citi-
zen participation. Proponents of this view claim that the armed
forces can only be considered a truly "legitimate" extension of citi-
zenry if the military is a citizen's institution, rather than the pre-
serve of career-oriented "regulars." An army that employs
mercenaries, professional killers, and "hired guns" to do its bidding
commits the "sulcidalness of militarism." An army that pulls from
the nation's populace the poor and socloeconrmically disadvantaged,
while excusing the wellborn and the privileged, the rich and the
educated, defies the fundamental principles of democratic govern-
ment and obligatory service by each and every member of the body
politic. (Eitelberg and Binkin in Goodpaster, et al.. 1982, pp. 244-
245)
Charles Moskos contends that representativeness in the
military of all parts of society is important, especially in a democracy
38
(Hunter and Nelson, in Scowcroft, 1982. p. 120). During each period of
the draft, issues of social class and educational representativeness were
raised (Hunter and Nelson, in Scowcroft, 1982, p. 119). The upper class
(particularly college graduates) was often underrepresented due to the
Selective Service exemption and deferment process. Representativeness
continues to be an issue with the AVF, but one that results from free
decisions made in the open marketplace (Hunter and Nelson, in Scow-
croft, 1982, pp. 119-120). There is a concern about using economic
incentives to induce participation and accepting the resulting lack of rep-
resentativeness that will erode the sense of public obligation that all
citizens ought to share (Danzig and Szanton. 1986, p. 78).
Although these arguments concern unfair overrepresenta-
tion of minorities and the disadvantaged in times of war, similar argu-
ments can be raised about infair underrepresentation if the manpower
policy is restricted to "high quality only in times of peace. This is
because disadvantaged youth would not be able to share in the benejIts
of military service in peacetime, yet would be expected to share the
responsibfty of military service in times of war.
The force drawdown has indeed affected the recruitment of
minorities and has caused concern. An article in the Washington Post
illustrates this concern:
Tougher military recruiting standards have forced a decrease in the
percentage of black enlistees in the nation's armed forces in the last
decade, but minorities continue to be a disproportionate number of
the young men and women joining the service today, according to a
congressional report released yesterday.
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The Congressional Budget Office report attributed some of the
decline in black recruits- as much as 6 percent among new Army
enlistees- to the military's tougher educational and testing stan-
dards for all recruits. The new standards would disqualify about 70
percent of all black males from joining the Army, according to the
study. In contrast, the standards would render about 30 percent of
non-black makes ineligible for Army service.
"The focus on recruit quality had a predictable effect on the
racial mix among recruits: It reduced the percentage of blacks and
other minorities," the report found. "Army policies disqualified a
large majority of blacks and other minorities, while leaving most
non-blacks eligible..." the report found.
But the report also found, "Although greater selectivity in
recruiting and blacks' relatively low test scores reduced total partici-
pation of blacks in the military. better qualified blacks continue to
be attracted to the services." (Moore, 1989)
b. Civil-Military Relations: Public Relations and Politics
The military system in the U.S. often functions in ways that
change the lives of thousands of Americans. However, policies that pro-
duce these changes are rarely due to the will and Judgment of the uni-
formed leadership alone (Karsten. 1978, p. 7). Civilian leaders, whether
in the executive or legislative branch, are generally responsible for the
key decisions that determine military policy. These leaders are politicians
and are therefore accountable and responsive to public opinion (Karsten,
1978, p. 7).
Policies that are congruent with national interests help pro-
vide popular and political support for the military. This means they will
probably support military programs (and associated funding) when atti-
tudes toward the miltary are positive, and will oppose such support
when attitudes toward the military are negative. The public always
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reserves the right and power to elect a candidate who supports popular
views concerning what the military should be. (Karsten, 1978. p. 7)
There is evidence that politicians and the military are sen-
sitive to this issue. For example, in a Report to the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives in 1967 by a Civilian Advisory Panel.
there is an entire section devoted to "Public Image of Military Manpower
Procurement." In this section is a discussion about public criticism
toward the draft in the areas of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Con-
cerned about this criticism, the panel recommended that the Deputy
Director of Selective Service for Public Affairs conduct a campaign to
better inform the public about the draft (Civilian Advisory Panel. 1967.
pp. 14-15). Another example of concern about attitudes of the public
came in the late 1980s. when severe military manpower cuts were pro-
posed. In order to gain popular and political support to help curb cuts.
proposals were made to use the military for popular programs, such as in
"The War Against Drugs," and to clean and protect the environment
(Shabecoff. 1990. p. 1). If unemployment, crime, and other issues that
relate, at least in part, to disadvantaged youth are a social and political
priority, then a military manpower policy that may help combat these
problems (without compromising national security) will most likely gain
popular and political support.
Recruiting also depends on popular and political support
because it draws from the civilian sector and will not attract recruits if it
has policies that are contrary to the goals and interests of the people. As
a former Assistant Secretary of Defense observes. "We are always
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dependent on how America feels about itself and about its military..."
(PWie, in American Enterprise Institute Studies in Defense Policy. 1980,
p. 5)
c. Responsibilities Qf Citizemhip
Citizenship has many privileges and benefits, especially in
the form of individual freedom. However, these privileges do not come
without a cost, a responsibility to defend the desired way of life. As
observed below:.
No obligation is more fundamental to citizenship than that of pre-
serving our free institutions. While all wage-earning citizens contrib-
ute to the common defense by paying taxes, only a fraction assume
the personal risk and sacrifice of military service. (Democratic
Leadership Council, 1988. p. 24)
Supporters of military service believe that society is served by fostering in
young people a commitment to citizenship duties (Moskos. 1988, p. 10).
Since aptitude and income are not prerequisites for citizenship, these
ideas should apply to all persons, including both advantaged and disad-
vantaged youth. One may well ask, then, should anyone be denied
enlistment If it can be shown that his or her service would be beneficial
to the individual, the military, and the nation as a whole?
d. The Military as an Agent qf Social Change
(1) Introduction. Adam Yarmolinsky, a former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, expands
on the DoD mission and lists its five major functions as follows: (1) pre-
venting the ultimate catastrophe of nuclear war: (2) protecting our
friends and allies against attack and giving them confidence to maintain
independent policies. even in the face of threats by another superpower;
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(3) deterring and defending against low-level violence and International
terrorism (internal and external "police" actions): (4) acting as an institu-
tion of social reform: and (5) protecting the U.S. from unforeseen dangers
and defending American interests in places and fashions not yet imag-
ined (Yarmolinsky, 1983, pp. 10-11). The fourth function, "acting as an
institution of social reform,* appears out of place for an organization that
seems "warlike" (anti-social) and competes with social programs in the
national budget. It is not included in DoD's mission statement and is not
popular among many military leaders. Because the primary mission of
the military is defense, caution is urged by some in placing too much
emphasis on the military as an agent of social change.
This is illustrated in the following statement by
Cooper:
To the extent possible, military manpower procurement should be
consistent with the nation's other economic, social and political
goals. In fact, one can go one step further and argue that, to the
extent possible and reasonable, military manpower procurement pol-
icy ought to further the nation's economic and social goals. For
example, the military helped pave the way for racial integration in
the 1950's.
At the same time we must be careful to avoid having "the tail
wag the dog." For example, adopting a policy of universal service
solely to encourage a "socialization" of American youth would seem
to be a great waste of the nation's resources. Alternatively, if such a
policy was useful for military purposes, then this socialization might
be a useful and positive by-product. (Cooper, in Scowcroft, 1982,
p. 157)
However, as pointed out by Eltelberg in "War Or Wel-
fare: TMe Military As An Agent Of Social Change.* the military establish-
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ment. by its mere size. cann~ot help but influence society (Eitelberg. 1989.
p. 3). Yarmolinsky points out that.
As an educational and a social institution the military establishment
has profound effects upon those whom it controls, and less direct
but possibly more potent effects on those civilian institutions with
which it, in many respects, competes .... * (Yarmolinsky, 1973. p. 324)
Eitelberg reports numerous, major social impacts by the military, includ-
ing racial integration and major educational programs and opportunities.
such as the G.I. bill, which have helped shape American society (Eitel-
berg. 1989. pp. 1-24). Included in his paper is a historical overview of the
military and employment of "Social Outsiders."
(2) History. The military has, throughout our history, been
perceived as an organization which could bring people from the "fringes"
into the mainstream of society. In the 19th century. Indians were
employed by the military to serve as scouts, guides and soldiers
(Eitelberg. 1989. p. 3). Although in separate units, it was hoped that
through training and exposure to the white American culture, the Indi-
ans would become "civilized* (Eitelberg. 1989, pp. 3-4). Similarly, blacks
were recruited into the Union Army during the Civil War, where they also
received training and education to help lay the foundation for cultural
assimilation (Eitelberg, 1989, p. 4). Immigrants. since the American
Revolution, also have had the opportunity to use military service as a
stepping stone for entering the social mainstream (Eitelberg, 1989, pp. 4-
5). Even today, military service is perceived as a chance for success.
Recruitment advertisements touting slogans such as "...a great place to
start...." "Be all that you can be." and "Get an edge on life" are
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particularly attractive to disadvantaged youth, who historically have had
few opportunities outside the military, such as vocational school, college,
or employment, because of a lack of family or personal resources.
Regarding the military as an agent for social change, the question
remains: does service in the military benefit disadvantaged youth and
then. indirectly, society as a whole? This is addressed in the next section.
e. Military Service and Social Upward Mobility
Are claims such as "the more depressed the socio-economic
background of the recruit, the more he seems likely to benefit from the
experience in the armed services" (Yarmolinsky, 1973, p. 325) mere per-
ception or reality? What concepts have led to this popular perception?
"Benefit" can have a range of meaning from the intangible
(such as self-esteem) to the more common measure of success (such as
raised income or earnings) i,• civilian life after military service. William
Beusse lists six theoretical benefits from military service: educational
upgrading, skill upgrading, geographic mobility, credential effect, social
adjustment, and the bridging environment effect (Beusse, 1974, p. 13). A
more detailed discussion of each of these six effects follows.
(1) Educational Upgrading. DoD offers servicemen a wide
range of educational opportunities, both during and after their service
careers (DoD. 1990, p. 11). For low-aptitude men, the high-school com-
pletion programs are probably the most important. For high-school grad-
uates (or equivalent), there ar• several college programs available that
allow continuation of education. Programs come in the form of financial
assistance or college credit programs, such as the College Level Exami-
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nation Program (CLEP) that allows college credit for non-traditional
learning (Beusse, 1974, p. 9). The military also offers college-level
In-service educational opportunities as well as tuition assistance for
qualified members (DoD, 1990, p. 3).
The strong positive relationship between education
and income is well documented (Beusse, 1974, p. 9: also see Ehrenberg.
1988. pp. 312-322. and Mincer, 1974). Completion of the General Edu-
cational Development (GED) equivalency program has also been shown to
result in higher civilian earnings (Beusse, 1974. p. 10).
Educational attainment is a "signal" of success in the
marketplace: that is. it shows the individual is capable of responsibly
completing a program, which can viewed as raising the quality of one's
life (Beusse. 1974. p. 10; also see Ehrenberg. 1988, p. 346).
(2) Skill Upgrading. At the Fifteenth Annual Conference of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Sommer. the editor of
Die Zert. Hamburg, Germany, stated:
There is no better way of strengthening our military establishment
than by making military service more attractive by teaching the sol-
dier skills which can be used once he returns to civilian life- ideally
skills which would not have been acquired if he had never donned a
uniform. (Sommer. in The International Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies, 1973, p. 34)
The American military is the largest vocational training
institution in the nation and probably the world (Yarmolinsky, 1973. p.
325). All servicemen receive some sort of entry-level skill training, either
formal or informal (Beusse. 1974. p. 10). There are also many advanced
skill level and complex technical training programs available. The value
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of this training in civilian life depends on how transferable the training is
to civilian Jobs (Beusse. 1974. p. 10). There are several studies which
compare the earnings of veterans and non-veterans, but their findings do
not agree. For example. alth;,uqh some studies have found that minority
veterans from all war • • ; fa, -ed better than minority nonveterans.
others have found that i-* loe not hold for Vietnam veterans (Mehay,
1990. p. 4). Much of the conflicting evidence can be attributed to differing
time periods, data sources, or analytical methods.
(3) Geographic Mobility. The potential for geographic
mobility is important in many respects. "Migration provides a social
mechanism for adjusting the geographical distribution of occupational
opportunities." (Beusse, 1974. p. 11) Also. studies have shown that the
place where one is born affects his or her future employment chances in
a variety of ways by subjecting the individual to the background and
educational limitations or advantages associated with that particular
place (Beusse, 1974, p. 12). In addition, other studies have shown that
migrants earn more than nonmigrants (Beusse. 1974. p. 12; also see
Ehrenberg, 1988, p. 364). Military service, because it almost always
involves geographic mobility, is a vehicle to make the service member
more comfortable and more likely to move. even after discharge (Beusse,
1974, p. 12). So. it appears that by getting used to moving and by being
exposed to several different regions of the country, the military veteran
has increased mobility that can consequently act to improve his or her
post-service economic well- being.
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(4) Credential Effect. For non-high-school graduates. an
honorable discharge from the military may similarly serve as a credential
or proof that a program was completed successfully (Beusse, 1974.
p. 12). Much more than program completion is the awareness that the
military teaches obedience, respect for authority, and discipline. Thus. as
Ambrose and Barber observe, MThe prospective employee who has an
honorable discharge can present to employers what amounts to a guar-
antee that he will not be a trouble-maker. (Ambrose and Barber. 1972.
p. 15) In the absence of other requirements, the veteran with an honor-
able discharge is probably more likely to receive preference over nonvet-
erans (Beusse. 1974. pp. 12-13) So. the non-high-school graduate is the
one who stands the most to gain from this credential effect (Beusse.
1974, p. 12).
(5) Social Adjustment. Teamwork and working with others
are a major part of military life. The servicemember is also placed in posi-
tions of higher responsibility than his or her civilian counterparts.
(Beusse. 1974. p. 13)
(6) Bridging Environment Effect. In 1973. Browning,
Lopreato, and Poston provided the theoretical construct of the military
experience as an application of the "bridging occupation," defined as "one
which provides, through work experience. the conditions and opportuni-
ties for movement from one occupation or cluster of occupations to
another.* (Browning. et al., 1973. p. 76) As applied to the military, the
word "occupation* can be replaced by "environmenC with the sense that
the military experience is one in which the individual may acquire new
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skills and abilities that, after mlltary service, could help him or her in a
civilian career (Browning. et al., 1973, p. 76). Browning. Lopreato. and
Poston contend that military experience helps assimilation of racial and
ethnic minorities into the civilian occupational structure (Browning. et
al.. 1973, p. 76). They explain that minorities tend to live in enclaves,
some-what isolated from the mainstream of society. Military service
reduces many primary ties to kin and commurity and aids in breaking
down the dependence upon racial and ethnic enclaves. The service also
provides minorities with experience in dealing with large-scale. complex
organizations which may be encountered later in civilian life. Browning.
Lopreato, and Poston also considered the benefits of education and train-
ing. To summarize. Browning. Lopreato, and Poston state:
... for many, if not all minority men, military service can positively
affect their subsequent chances in the opportunity structure of civil-
ian society. Geographic mobility and personal independence, educa-
tion. occupational training of various kinds, and experience in
bureaucratic structures, all make it easier for the veteran to obtain
those civilian Jobs that provide better pay.. Anglo veterans will be at
an economic disadvantage vis-A-vis Anglo non-veterans: that is.
veterans will earn less than nonveterans. Conversely, among blacks,
and Mexican Americans...on the average, veterans will earn more
than nonveterans of the same group. (Browning et al.. 1973, p. 77)
Of note, this hypothesis is not universally accepted. A
quote from the New York Times, for example, points out:
The myth that Army service can help by training deprived blacks for
civilian Jobs is little borne out by the facts. Usable civilian skills are
least likely to be acquired in the ground combat forces, where most
blacks are, while they are under-represented in the technical and
support services, a vastly better training ground. (Binkin and Eltel-
berg, 1982. p. 73)
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Binkin and Eltelberg. noting both points of view. sum It up as follows:
"All in all, while the military clearly provides employment opportunitics
for black youths, whites tend to acquire training and skills that put them
In a position to compete for better jobs in the civilian sector." (Bunkin and
Eltelberg. 1982. p. 73)
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m. PROJECT 100.000: THE PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapters III and IV comprise the case study of Project 100,000. This
chapter describes Project 100.000. Chapter IV analyzes five major stud-
ies that evaluated Project 100.000 using the research questions outlined
in Chapter I.
B. BACKGROUND
Project 100,000 was established in 1966 by the Secretary of
Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and was related to the War on Poverty
program. In a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, on August 23,
1966 he declared:
The poor of America have not had the opportunity to earn their fair
share of this nation's abundance, but they can be given an opportu-
nity to serve in their Country's defense, and they can be given the
opportunity to return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes which
for them and their families will reverse the downward spiral of
human decay. (Heisey. Means, and Laurence. 1985. p.5)
Under this program, the physical and mental standards applied to
potential military recruits were revised. Men who scored as low as the
10th percentile on the AFgT qualified for military service (Beusse, 1974.
p. 3). Non-hlgh-school graduates with an AFQT percentile score between
10 and 30 were additionally required to pass certain supplementary apti-
tude tests (Beusse. 1974. p. 3). The primary purpose of Project 100.000
was that both the military and the individual would benefit by opening
up recruitment to individuals of lower ability (Beusse. 1974. p. 3). The
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military would benefit by increasing the current available supply of man-
power and. by dealing with large numbers of low-aptitude men, could
benefit from this experience (in selection, training, assignment and uti-
lization techniques) so that in the future when CAT TVs would need to be
called on again (during times of high manpower requirements, for exam-
ple), the military would be ready (Beusse. 1974, p. 3). The other benefit
to the military would be the service that these individuals performed.
that is, their productivity. The individual would benefit from an increased
opportunity for education, skill development, and work experience, and
society would benefit directly from the contribution they would make as
productive citizens and indirectly from the "ripple effect." The positive
effects of their education, training, and improved socioeconomic condi-
tions would pass to their next generation, helping to break the cycle of
poverty (Sticht. et al., 1987, p. 183).
To test whether the goals of Project 100.000 would be achieved.
Secretary McNamara intended that Project 100.000 be a -controlled"
experiment, subject to continued monitoring, to include military perfor-
mance and post-service follow-up studies (Sticht, et al.. 1987, p. 40).
This program was not intended to help low-aptitude men but to help the
focus group of this study, the "disadvantaged" (low-aptitude young men
from low-income families) (Eitelberg, 1990, p. 18).
Support for Project 100,000 came out of a report entitled One-Third
of a Nation. by the President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation in
1964 (Eitelberg. 1990. p. 18). This report found that about one-third of
all the nation's 18-year-old men would fail to meet military entrance
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standards (Eitelberg, 1990. p. 18). Furthermore. the report concluded
that "...a major proportion of these young men are the products of
poverty...They have inherited their situation from their parents...and
unless the cycle is broken, they will almost surely transmit it to their
children." (Eitelberg, 1990, p. 18) Because low aptitude correlated with
poverty and unemployment. it was assumed that a program of lowered
enlistment standards would attract those from low-income families and
therefore aid in the fight against poverty (Eitelberg. 1990, p. 18). But the
military never applied low-income criteria, so the original objective of
fighting poverty was redirected toward helping those with low aptitude,
regardless of their economic situation (Eitelberg. 1990, p. 18).
Project 100,000 allowed the annual induction of 100.000 men who
would otherwise be screened out due to their limited educational back-
ground and low aptitude test scores. Approximately 311,000 recruits
were inducted due to the lower aptitude standards under Project 100,000
between 1966 and 1971 (Eitelberg. 1988, pp. 172-173). The armed ser-
vices took an additional 30.127 recruits who were "medical remedials"
and would have previously been disqualified for 'correctable" physical
defects rather than for low scores on the aptitude test. Participants in
Project 100,000 were called "New Standards Men" (Beusse, 1974, p. 3).
DoD established that program participants were to meet the same
in-service performance standards as other personnel (Heisey, et. al.,
1985, p. 7). Each service was to provide help, if needed, during training
to allow New Standards Men to meet criteria for retention and advance-
ment in service (Heisey, et. al., 1985, p. 7). Several remedial literacy
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programs were developed and modified tmining methods were employed
(Heisey, et. al., 1985. pp. 7 and 9). There were inconsistencies In the
treatment and training of the men, however, which is discussed in
Chapter IV.
C. PROP=I OF PARTICIPANTS
1. Introduction
This section describes the demographic characteristics of low-
aptitude men in Project 100,000. Characteristics include: aptitude sub-
category, age, race, education, geographic region, and pre-service income
level (where information was available).
2. Aptitude Subcategory
The aptitude level of most of the New Standards Men was IV-C.
the lowest acceptable AFQT subcategory for enlistment, including scores
between the 10th and 15th percentiles. (Laurence. et al.. 1985. p. 4)
S. Age
The majority (76 percent) of the low-aptitude personnel were
born between 1947 and 1951. and most were between the ages of 17 and
23 at the time of enlistment. (Laurence, et al.. 1985, p. 6)
4. Race
The Project 100,000 data base was limited to two racial cate-
gories, 'Black* and 'Nonblack." The overall percentage of black New
Standards Men was 34 percent. (Laurence, et al.. 1985. p. 9)
5. Education
The percentages of high-school graduates and nongraduates
were approximately equal among New Standards Men (51 percent and 49
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percent, respectively) (Laurence, et al.. 1985, p. 9). For the most part,
black New Standards Men tended to be high-school graduates, whereas
whites in this group tended to be nongraduates (Laurence, et al.. 1985.
p. 9).
6. Geographic Region
The geographic variables were limited to "South* and 'Non-South"
because previous analyses have shown that these two categories are
important for predicting income. Participants were divided roughly
equally between the southern and non-southern regions. (Laurence, et
al.. 1985, p. 12)
7. Income Level (where data was available)
Pre-service weekly income serves as the indicator of socioeco-
nomic status. For this limited sample of New Standards Men, pre-servlce
weekly income was reported as zero (46 percent), from $1 to $100 (41
percent). from $101 to $200 (12 percent), and greater than or equal to




In this chapter, five major studies on Project 100,000 are evaluated
to answer this study's research questions. The five studies include DoD
(1969): Beusse (1974): Stlcht, Armstrong. Hickey and Caylor (1987):
Ramsberger and Means (1987); and Laurence, Ramsberger and Gribben
(1989).
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS: BENEFIT8
Evaluations aid decision makers in determining whether a program
or policy is "worth* the resources and effort required to support It. One
central focus in assessing the program's or policy's worth is whether its
goals were achieved. (Quade, 1989, pp. 272-279)
1. Did the Military Benefit from the Employment of
Disadvantaged Youth?
This question was addressed in three of the five studies exam-
ined here. "Benefit to the millitar" is a subjective term, but researchers
generally used measures of training/education completion and perfor-
mance measures such as evaluations of job performance, attrition, disci-
pline, and reenlistment to make it more objective. The three studies are
detailed below.
a. Department of Dlfens (1969)
(1) Introduction. As pointed out in Chapter III, Project
100.000 was intended to be a controlled experiment. DoD collected data
56
for the Project 100,000 studies. Documents and reports were housed at
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and were later transferred to
the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO).
During Project 100.000. each of the services was asked
to draw a control group so that the performance of the New Standards
Men could be compared to that of a group of men who qualified for ser-
vice under extsting standards (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, p. 6). After
a review of the data. DoD (1969) reported the following:
(2) Results.
" Training/Education.
0 Basic training- New Standards Men completed basic training at a
rate of 95 percent. as compared to 98 percent of the control
group. (DoD. 1969, p. xv)
0 Formal skills training-The attrition rate for New Standards Men
was 10 percent in formal skills training, whereas the rate for the
control group was about 4 percent. (DoD, 1969. p. xvi)
0 Educational Achievement- Of the New Standards Men who
received remedial reading instruction. 80 percent successfully
completed their program. The average trainee began the program
at the bottom of the fourth-grade reading level and advanced
through this training to the sixth-grade level. (DoD, 1969, p. xxii)
"* Performance. In general, the performance of these Category IVs was
lower than that of higher aptitude men. but their performance was
still "acceptable" (DoD. 1969. p. xxviii). The Project 100.000 data-
base does not have a direct measure of performance. so this conclu-
sion was based on the following indirect measures:
0 Grade level achieved-The services reported that the promotion
rates of Project 100.000 participants were satisfactory: in general.
they were promoted on schedule. (DoD. 1969, p. xviiI)
0 Supervisory evaluations-The ratings for New Standards Men
were as follows: In the Army, 98 percent "good" to "excellent"
compared with 99 percent of the control group: Navy, 92 percent
"effective" to "extremely effective" compared with 97 percent of the
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control group; Air Force, 93 percent in the highest five levels
compared with 98 percent of the control group; Marine Corps. 92
percent rated "good" to "outstanding" as compared with 96 per-
cent of the control group. (DoD, 1969, p. xix)
0 Offenses- Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) is awarded for offenses
such as traffic violations, missing bed checks, violating curfew, or
lateness (DoD, 1969, p. xx). New Standards Men had a rate of 13
percent of NJP as opposed to eight percent for the control group.
Court-martial convictions are for more serious violations such as
unauthorized absence, desertion, striking a superior, or robbery.
New Standards Men had a three percent conviction rate com-
pared with 1.4 percent of the control group. (DoD, 1969, p. xd)
0 Attrition from active service-The New Standards Men had a
higher attrition rate (12 percent) than did the control group
(seven percent) (DoD, 1969. p. xxii). The attrition rate for blacks
was less than that for whites: nine percent compared with 14 per-
cent. (DoD, 1969, p. xxiv)
0 Reenlistment- Reenlistment actually is a benefit to both the mili-
tary and the individual, so this area overlaps between the Primary
Research Questions 1 and 2.
Either way you view it, the results showed a reenlistment rate of
only six percent for New Standards Men. The reenlistment rate
for the control group was not reported.
(3) Conclusions. DoD (1969) found that the performance
of Project 100,000 participants was lower than that of individuals with
higher aptitude. Nonetheless, the performance of New Standards men
was considered "acceptable" (DoD. 1969, p. xxviUi). As for an overall con-
clusion regarding the "success" of Project 100.000. researchers who
reviewed the data collected, analyzed, and reported by DoD reported con-
flicting conclusions (Sticht. et al.. 1987. p. 38). For example. Baskir and
Strauss (1978) concluded:
In the opinion of many military leaders, social planners, and liberal
critics, Project 100,000 proved a failure. While it expanded the
wartime manpower pool, it also required additional resources which
the services could ill afford. But above all, it was a failure for the
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recruits themselves. They never got the training that military service
seemed to promise. They were the last to be promoted and the first
to be sent to Vietnam. They saw more than their share of combat
and got more than their share of bad discharges. Many ended with
greater difficulties In civilian society than when they started. For
them, It was an ironic and tragic conclusion to a program that
promised special treatment and a brighter future, and denied both.
from Eitelberg. 1988. p. 180)
A conflicting conclusion was found by Sullivan (1970) in a study for the
President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force:
The magnitude of the differentials between NS (New Standards) men
and control groups is...an important finding from the Project
100,000 experience. The higher attrition rate in training NS men was
found, for example, to add only 3 to 5 percent to the full training
costs. When performance is measured by supervisory ratings. the
difference between NS men and control groups is negligible. One
cannot help but conclude that the Project 100,000 experiment has
been a success and should be continued...
The evidence assembled in the study leads us to the conclusion
that the relaxed mental standards applicable to Project 100,000 can
provide the requisite quality to effectively man the enlisted billets in
an all-volunteer force. This is not to imply that the Services will con-
sist entirely of mental group IV recruits, but that the acceptable per-
centage of mental group IV inputs can be as high as 25 to 30 per-
cent in the Army and Marine Corps, and 20 to 25 percent in the
Navy and Air Force. (from Eltelberg. 1988. pp. 181-182)
b. Sticht, Armstrong, Hickey, and Caylor (1987)
(1) Performance. Stlcht, et al. performed two studies. The
first study evaluated the performance of New Standards Men as mea-
sured by aitrition, advancement, 0' .Inary problems, and supervisor's
efficiency ratings. The second st examined "careerists"- that Is, those
Project 100,000 men who staye the military after their initial enlist-
ment and were still on active du-., 1983 (Stlcht, et al., 1987, pp. 39
and 49) The results for both studies were reported in Cast-Off Youth and
are summarized below.
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"* Attrition. Most New Standards Men entered the military for a two-
year initial tour of duty (Stlcht, et al.. 1987. p. 50). Some men joined
for a three- or four-year tour; the Air Force, for example, had a four-
year requirement, while almost all of the New Standards Men in the
Army had a two-year obligation. For total DoD, the attrition rates for
New Standards Men were about twice that of the control sample of
men with a comparable length of service (Stlcht. et al., 1987, p. 52).
To look at it from a positive perspective- that Is, "completion"
instead of "attrition"- New Standards Men finished service at a rate
of from 65 percent in the Marine Corps to 88 percent for the Army
and Navy. for an overall DoD success rate of 84 percent. (Sticht, et
al., 1987 p. 52)
"* Advancement. The pay-grade distribution of New Standards Men
and a control group after 19-24 months of service showed that New
Standards Men advanced more slowly than did the comparison
group. (Sticht, et al., 1987, p. 52)
" Supervisor's Efficiency Ratings. After 22-24 months of service,
about 85 percent of the New Standards Men received a rating of
performance as good, highly effective, or better. The efficiency
ratins of the control group were not provided. (Sticht. et al.. 1987.p. 52}f
(2) Impacts after the initial enlistment: Careerists. Again,
this can be considered a part of both Primary Research Questions 1 and
2 because both the military and the individual benefit from reenlistment.
As of 1983. more than 8,200 New Standards Men were still in the
military (some with a tenure of 12-17 years) (Sticht, et al., 1987, p. 60).
During that time, 'they had increased their aptitude scores and edu-
cational levels, attained higher occupational status, and received
increased rank, pay, and benefits* (Sticht, et al., 1987. p. 60). So, for this
group, Project 100,000 provided not only employment but a lifetime
career in service to their country (SUcht, et al., 1987, p. 60).
(3) Conclusion. Based on their research, reported In Cast-
Off Youth and summarized above, SUcht, et al. concluded that Project
100,000 was successful in achieving its goals:
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The findings presented in this chapter for Project 100.000 personnel
indicate that far and away the majority of these men did perform
satisfactorily, they did not cause excessive disciplinary problems,
and they did benefit from the training and educational offerings of
the military. Over 8.000 benefitted directly in the form of a lifetime
career.... (Sticht, et al.. 1987, p. 64)
c. Ramsber and Means (1987)
(1) Introduction. In their study, entitled Military Perfor-
mance of Low-Aptitude Recnuts: A Reexamination of Data From Project
100,000 and the ASVAB Misnorming PerlocL Ramsberger and Means
researched two central questions: (1) Was there a negative impact on the
services (in terms of increased training time, greater attrition. etc.) as a
result of admitting larger numbers of low-aptitude (CAT IV) individuals?
and (2) How did the low-aptitude (CAT MV) recruits perform in Jobs of
varying complexity, that Is, did aptitude interact with job complexity in a
way that lower-aptitude individuals performed better on lower-skill-
requirement Jobs? The answers to these questions would aid the services
in predicting the impact to be expected if the standards had to be lowered
in the future and to help them adjust classification procedures to maxi-
mize the performance of individuals in lower aptitude categories.
Ramsberger and Means performed their analysis twice.
each time using a different control group. The first time they used the
entire control group (individuals from AFQT Categories I-IV) and the
second time they used a control group drawn from the lowest AFQT
category accepted under the AFQT standards that preceded Project
100.000. These were: Category IVA for the Army. Air Force, and Marine
Corps and Category IIIB for the Navy, which will be referred to as the
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"*Marginally Eligible" control group. (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, pp. 6-
7 and 14)
Only the overall Project 100,000 control group anal-
yses were performed because there was not a large enough sample for
the "marginally eligible" control group (not enough occupational data
available). (Ramsberger and Means. 1987. p. 21)
(2) Results.
"* The New Standards Men did not perform as well as the overall con-
trol group In a number of significant ways. For example. New Stan-
dards Men were more likely than control group members to be
recycled through basic training (Navy. Marine Corps, Air Force) and
to need remedial training (Army. Navy. Air Force). They were also
less likely to complete skill training (Marine Corps, Air Force) and to
be eligible for reenlistment (Air Force). (Ramsberger and Means,
1987. pp. v-vl)
"• In general, these differences remained even when the comparison
group was limited to those in the lowest-aptitude-qualifled cate-
gory.(Ramsberger and Means. 1987, p. vi)
"* Within-Job comparisons were made for two Navy, one Marine Corps,
four Army, and four Air Force occupations. All of the Navy and
Marine Corps and half of the Army and Air Force occupations were
low in terms of cogittive skill requirements as defined by Sticht and
Caylor (1982); the other Army and Air Force jobs were classified as
having medium skill requirements. Fewer differences were found
between the New Standards Men and the controls when performance
was examined within occupations, and no pattern was uncovered
indicating that the performance of the New Standards Men was bet-
ter In low-skill Jobs compared to those of medium skill. (Ramsberger
and Means, 1987, p. vi)
(3) Conclusions. Ramsberger and Means framed their
overall conclusion in a comparison between the Project 100,000
experiment and the ASVAB Misnorming episode (described in Chapter II).
They concluded that New Standards Men generally were not successful
In the military. However, they found more positive results for low-
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aptitude men who served under the ASVAB Misnorming. The authors
cautioned against drawing conclusions regarding the usefulness of low-
aptitude recruits based on Project 100,000 because of confounding fac-
tors in the program that could bias results. Confounding factors are
discussed in the answer to research question three of the analysis.
2. Did the Individual. and Thus Society. Benefit from the
Employment of Disadvantaged Youth?
The last two of the five studies examined looked at the post-
service lives of Project 100.000 participants. Variables used to measure
outcomes included items such as employment and income level, occupa-
tional category, educational attainment, and so on. These two studies are
examined below.
a. William Beuse (1974)
(1) Introduction. Beusse conducted a follow-up study of
Project 100,000 veterans with a matched comparison group of low-
aptitude nonveterans in 1974. The purpose of the study was to "examine
the impact of military experience upon the post-service lives of low
aptitude men" (Beusse. 1974, p. 1). He reported his results in the areas
of education, occupation, and geographic mobility. Of note, his findings
were also reported in Cast-Off Youth by Sticht, et al., so both sources are
referenced in this section.
(2) Results.
e Education. DoD operates a wide variety of educational programs, so
it Is expected that veterans will have increased their education levels
in a higher proportion than nonveterans (Beusse, 1974, p. 23). Pro-
grams include the General Educational Development (GED) and
College Level Examination Program (CLEP) (Sticht, et al., 1987,
p. 62). Ten percent of the veteran group, as opposed to three percent
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of the nonveteran group, obtained a GED (Beusse, 1974. p. 23).
Although both groups increased their proportion of high-school
graduates. a higher percentage of veterans gained high-school cre-
dentials. (Beusse, 1974. p. 24)
"Employment. Approximately 82 percent of both groups were
employed full time and eight percent of both groups were employed
part time. so there was no distinction in these two categories of
employment. However. in the unemployment statistics, only six per-
cent of the veterans were unemployed, compared to nine percent of
nonveterans (comparison group). (Sticht, et al., 1987. p.63)
"* Occupation. Project 100,000 veterans were found to be employed in
the higher-skilled, higher-paying occupations and industries as
compared with the control group (Beusse. 1974. p. 42). Union mem-
bership, a prominent factor in occupational life, was also higher
among the veteran group (Beusse, 1974, p. 28). The higher wages for
veterans existed for both high-school and non-high-school graduates
and within each racial category (Sticht, et al., 1987, pp. 63-64).
" Geographic Mobility. Geographic mobility is significant in examin-
ing economic success because "migration provides a social mecha-
nism for adjusting the geographical distribution of manpower to the
geographical distribution of occupational opportunities" (Beusse,
1974, p. 11). Geographic mobility makes it easier for the veteran to
obtain those civilian jobs that have higher pay (Browning, et al..
1973. p. 77). Veterans were found to be more geographically mobile
than nonveterans: a higher proportion of them subsequently moved
away from the geographic region in which they were living at the
time they registered with the Selective Service (Beusse, 1974, p. 42).
(3) Conclusions. As stated by Beusse:
The results of the data analysis indicate that military service has a
positive impact upon the post-service lives of low aptitude men.
Compared to their nonveteran twins. it was found that veterans were
more likely to (1) complete their high school education or obtain a
GED, (2) be employed in the higher skilled, higher paying occupa-
tions and industries, (3) have joined a union, and (4) to have
migrated from the geographic region in which they lived at age 18.
It was also found that veterans earn significantly higher wages
than nonveterans. Veterans fared better than nonveterans within
each racial-educational subgroup. These income differences were
found to be independent of unmatched background characteristics.
(Beusse, 1974, p. 1-a)
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b. StIcht, Arnusn, itckey, and Camlor (1987)
This study was covered in detail above because most of the
research focused on the benefits of allowing disadvantaged youth to se.ve
in the military (the topic of research question 1). However, these
researchers add another educational impact of military service for the
Individual -namely. the G.I. B3ll. This educational benefit allowed many
veterans to upgrade their education after leaving the service. In fact. 68
percent of New Standards Men were reported to be using their G.I. Bill as
of 1974. (Stlcht, et al.. 1987, p. 62)
c. Laurence, Ramsberger, and Oribben (1989)
(1) Introduction. Laurence. Ramsberger, and Gribben con-
-ted a follow-up study to determine the current (1986-1987) status of
New Standards Men in comparison with a control group (Laurence. et al..
1989, p. ill). Three sets of analyses were performed: comparisons of the
New Standards Men and the entire control groups selected by the ser-
vices, comparisons of the New Standards Men and only that portion of
the control group consisting of those minimally (but fully) qualified for
service under standards in effect over the course of Project 100.000. and
comparisons within selected military Jobs (as defined under the Defense
Duty Occupation Classification, or DDOC codes).
(2) Results.
Employment and Occupation.
0 Full- and part-time employment- The results show no significant
differences between the employment status of veteran (Project
100.000) and nonveteran men (Laurence. et al., 1989. p. 71). This
holds true whether the part-time employees were grouped with
full-time employees or with the unemployed (Laurence, et al.,
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1989. p. 71). Comparisons between all three groupings could not
be carried out due to the small number of part-time employees.
About 88 percent of the prior New Standards Men were employed
either full- or part-time, compared with 91 percent of the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS) sample used as the control group.
When the New Standards Men who were still on active duty were
included, the difference was even smaller, raising the percentage
from 88 to 89 for the Project 100,000 group. Controlling for
length of service showed no significant differences (Laurence, et
al.. 1989, p. 71). There was an age difference between the two
samples: the New Standards Men were in the 40-45 age range
while the control group was younger. 30-35. When the research-
ers controlled for age. significant differences were found: Project
100.000 participants in the 30-35 age group were more likely to
be unemployed than were comparably aged members of the con-
trol group (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 73).
0 Type of establishment in which employed- Significant differences
were found when the researchers looked at the type of establish-
ment in which the men were employed. A higher number of men
in the control group worked in a private company or in their own
business (91 percent), compared with 77.3 percent of New Stan-
dards Men (Laurence. et al., 1989, p. 75). Conversely, 22.7 of the
New Standards Men held government jobs, whereas nine percent
of the control group were government employees (Laurence, et al..
1989. p. 75). This significant difference holds true whether all or
only full-time workers are compared.
0 Civilian Occupational Category differences-The civilian occupa-
tional categories used in the comparisons were: (1) Professional,
Technical. and Managerial; (2) Sales. Clerical, and Administrative
Support; (3) Service. Private Household. and Other. (4) Farmers
and Farm Managers. Farm Laborers and Foremen, and Laborers:
and (4) Craftsmen, Operatives, Repair, and Precision Production.
There were no statistically slgfcant differences between the
Project 100,000 men and those in the control group.
0 Work tenure-The question concerning work tenure was: "Of all
jobs held in the past five years, which one was held for the long-
est timer* (Laurence, et al.. 1989, p. 77) The New Standards Men
responded with a mean of 9.6 years compared with 7.9 years for
the control group (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 77). Since Job stabil-
ity may be correlated with age, the data were examined with a
control for age (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 77). When age was
controlled (including only individuals who were 35-40 at the time
of the survey), there was no significant difference between the two
groups regarding job stability. (Laurence et al., 1989, p. 80)
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* Income. The control sample reported income for 1980. while the
Project 100,000 veterans reported income for either 1986 or 1987
(Laurence, et al.. 1989. p. 827). Researchers adjusted for inflation to
compare these figures from different years (Laurence. et al.. 1989.
p. 82). The adjustment factors were derived to equate income infor-
mation to a common 1985 metric while accounting for differences in
age and education (Laurence. et al.. 1989, p.82).
0 Hourly pay-The results show that when age ranges were not
matched, the control group had an hourly wage of approximately
four dollars more than the Project 100,000 veterans (Laurence. et
al.. 1989. p. 83). This difference was statistically significant.
When age was controlled, however, by using the data from only
those 35-40 years of age, the difference between the two groups
was even greater, with the control group earning more than five
dollars per hour more than the men who participated in Project
100.000 (Laurence. et al.. 1989. p. 83).
0 Total household income-Total household income (all family
members and all sources, with adjustments where necessary) for
the year prior to the survey was reviewed, first without controlling
for age and then just comparing the 35-40 year olds (Laurence. et
al.. 1989, p. 86). Approximately 35 percent of both samples (full-
time workers) had household income below $20,000. With work-
ers of all ages. there was a seven-percent difference, but this dif-ference was not statistically significant. When age was controlled.
there was a significant difference (as with hourly income with the
matched age evaluation) (Laurence, et al.. 1989, p. 86). In this
case, 80 percent of the control group had a total household
income of over $20.000. whereas the New Standards Men had
only 63 percent at this level.
0 Farm or business ventures- One alteration was made to these
data: Individuals who reported $0 in earnings were not included
(treated as missing data). The assumption here was that individ-
uals who have a job earn some form of income from their
employment (Laurence. et al., 1989. p. 86). The fact that no
income was reported was interpreted to mean that the individual
either did not know or did not care, or that the interviewer
miscoded the response (Laurence, et al., 1989. p. 89). When the
focus was on both wages and farm/business income and these
Individuals gave an answer to the latter, they were included in
the analyses (Laurence, et al.. 1989, p. 89).
Results showed that, overall, the persons in the control group
earned significantly more than the New Standards Men.
(Laurence. et al.. 1989, p. 89)
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* Other Economic Factors. These factors include employer fringe
benefits, receipt of public assistance (any form) one year prior to the
survey, and receipt of assistance from relatives in the previous year.
(Laurence et al., 1989, pp. 92-95)
0 Fringe benefits (commonly offered by employers)- The results
show that both groups had a high percentage of benefits, with the
control group reporting a significantly higher proportion of medi-
cal and retirement benefits.
0 Public assistance (welfare or unemployment compensation)-
Comparisons showed no significant differences between the two
groups in the receipt of public assistance. This same result was
obtained when controlling for age (ages 35-40 only) and when
unemployment compensation was compared in the number of
weeks received. (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 96)
0 Assistance from relatives-When compared without controlling
for age. the control group had a higher rate (9.5 percent) of assis-
tance from relatives than did the Project 100,000 participants
(3.7 percent). However, since this is a measure which can be cor-
related with age, the information was evaluated again, and this
time there was no significant differencc between the two groups.
(Laurence. et al., 1989, p. 97)
* Education and Training.
0 Education- When age was not controlled, a significant difference
was found in the mean years of the highest grade completed, with
the higher percentage belonging to the control group (12.3
percent vs. 11.7 years) (Laurence. et al., 1989, p. 100). But when
the age range was matched, there was no significant difference
(Laurence. et al.. 1989. p. 100).
Another way to view educational achievement is to look at the
highest level completed. From this perspective, the results show
that there was only one comparison which was significant: the
comparison between those who had a high-school diploma or less
and the percentage who had at least some college (Laurence. et
al.. p. 100). However, when age was controlled, even this differ-
ence became insignificant (Laurence, et al., p. 100).
0 Training- Questions were asked to determine three aspects of
training participation: whether there was participation, whether t
training was completed, and. finally, what kind of training was
received. (Laurence. et al., p. 104)
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A significantly higher percentage (68 percent) of the control group
than the Project 100.000 group (42 percent) responded that they
had participated in training programs. There was no difference in
this result after controlling for age (Laurence. et al., p. 104). The
Project 100.000 participants, however, were told not to include
their military training. If they had been able to report it, these
results might have been different. Also, their military training
might have eliminated their need to receive any additional train-
Ing outside of the service (Laurence, et al.. p. 104).
Of the respondents who did receive training, a follow-on question
asked whether they completed their training. Approximately one-
third of the respondents in both the control group and Project
100.000 group failed to complete their training: there was no
significant difference between these two groups. (Laurence, et al.,
p. 104)
Finally, those who said they participated in training were asked
what type of training they had received. There was a great deal of
similarity between the types of courses taken by the Control
group and Project 100.000 group: there was only a slight ten-
dency toward more managerial training among the control group
and more "other types of training" for the Project 100,000.
(Laurence. et al.. p. 107)
Marital and Family Status. Marital and family status was evaluated
because the "abtlity to enter in and maintain a life-long relationship
and contribute to society by raising the next generation of Americans
is often viewed as a sign of a stable and mature individual."
(Laurence, et al., p. 108)
There were no significant differences between the two groups in cur-
rent marital status when controls were not placed on age (Laurence.
et al.. p. 108). When age was taken into account, however, signifi-
cant differences did result (Laurence, et al., p. 108). The researchers
reported that 16 percent more of the control group respondents were
married (compared to the New Standards Men), while the divorce
rate for the New Standards Men was almost two times greater than
that of the control group (Laurence. et al., p. 110). Also. while all of
the control group responded that they had been married at least
once, nearly seven percent of the New Standards Men responded
that they had never been married.
The comparison of average number of marriages was made once
without controlling for age and once controlling for age. Without the
age controls, the average for the Project 100,000 respondents was
1.4 marriages. The control group had a significantly lower result at
1. 1. When age was controlled, this difference was smaller (but still
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statistically significant). 1.3 for the Project 100,000 group compared
to 1.2 for the control group.
The number of children fathered by both groups was also deter-
mined. Resulting figures reveal that 19 percent of the New Stan-
dards Men were childless compared to no childless men in the
control group (Laurence, et al., p. 110). The number of children
fathered was again compared with and without age controls. When
there was no control for age. the average number of children for the
control group was significantly higher; when the age ranges were
matched, there was a slightly larger difference.
Veteran's Subjective Opinions. Project 100,000 participants who
separated from the service were asked if they felt their military expe-
rience helped, hurt, or had no Impact on their careers. Those who
responded that it had helped or hurt their career were asked to give
specific reasons for this reported effect. In addition, all respondents
were asked to assess the impact of being in the military on their lives
(Laurence, et al., 1989. p. 113). Approximately 50 percent of the New
Standards Men felt that the military had a positive effect on their
life, as opposed to only 14 percent who felt it had a negative effect;
the rest (36 percent) reported that they felt there was no impact
(Laurence, et al.. 1989, p. 114). Blacks had a higher probability than
did whites of feeling that their military experience was positive
(Laurence. et al., 1989, p. 114).
When respondents were asked to name specific ways in which the
military helped their careers, maturity was the attribute mentioned
most often. Of interest, it was found that the percentage of non-
blacks citing educational assistance was higher than for blacks, but
the reverse was true for military training (Laurence, et al., 1989.
p. 115). Military training was listed more frequently by high-school
graduates than by nongraduates (Laurence, et al.. 1989. p. 115).
When asked about what benefit military service had on their lives in
general. maturity again was the attribute named the greatest num-
ber of times. About one-third of the sample said that their military
experience had no effect on their life. (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 116)
Overall, though the objective data in this study provide little or no
support that military service benefits the individual, "a substantial
proportion of the respondents themselves felt that it was a positive
experience." (Laurence. et al., 1989. p. 118) Laurence, Ramsberger,
and Gribben attribute this inconsistency to a phenomenon first
described by Aronson and Mills (1959): "If one gives up a great deal
or works very hard to achieve a particular goal (in this case to serve
successfully in the military), then there must be positive aspects to,
or outcomes from, that experience." (Laurence. et al., 1989, p. 118)
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(3) Conclusions. This more recent research suggests that
Project 100.000 did not meet its goal of benefitting the individual through
military service. Laurence. Ramsberger. and Gribben conclude that:
Comparisons between Project 100.000 participants and their non-
veteran peers did not show veterans to have an advantage. In fact. in
terms of employment status, educational achievement, and income
those who never served appeared better off than those who had been
in the military. Veterans were found to be more likely to be unem-
ployed, and to have an average level of education significantly lower
than nonveterans. Income differences between the two groups
ranged from $5.000 to $7.000. depending on the sources included.
in favor of the nonveterans. Finally. veterans were less likely than
nonveterans to be married, and more likely to be divorced. (Laurence
et al., 1989, p. 0v)
This study by Laurence, Ramsberger, and Gribben
(1989) received nation-wide attention. The results were reported in sev-
eral diverse publications, such as the Washington Post. the American
Psychological Association's Monitor, and Science Agenda (see McAllister.
1990; Adler, 1990; and Sellman, 1990). This study could have a dramatic
effect, not only on military manpower policy issues but also on other
government-sponsored programs for the nation's youth. For example,
Representative Lane Evans (D-Ill.), a Vietnam-era veteran and chairman
on the House subcommittee on veterans oversight, believed the findings
to be "very significant" and predicted that they might influence proposed
legislation on some form of military-like national service program
(McAllister, 1990). As Evans stated, "This indicates the poorest of Ameri-
cans might not be able to benefit from sueh a program." (McAllister,
,"990)
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C. SECONDARY RESEARCH ISSUE QUESTION ONE: WERE THE
PROJECT 100.000 EVALUATIONS RLIABLE?
1. Statistical Methods Employed
The strength of any experiments credibility lies partly in the
power of particular statistical tools chosen to analyze the data. For the
five studies currently under evaluation, the statistical methods ranged
from simple calculations of percentages and averages to the more com-
plex multivariate analysis of variance. Notes, including both strengths
and weaknesses, on the statistical methods employed for each of the five
studies are listed below. The failure to control for confounding factors.
which is discussed in the research question two results (see below), is
also a weakness in statistical methods employed. So in this way, there is
overlap between the results for the two questions under Secondary
Research Issues. Rather than repeat the discussion in both research
questions, confounding factors will be covered for research question two
only. with the understanding that the failure to control for them also
indicates a problem with the methods employed by the researchers.
2. Notes on the Individual Research Methods
a. DoD (1969)
DoD (1969) did not use multivariate statistical procedures.
Instead, DoD analysts merely calculated mean values and percentages
for a number of variables for Project 100,000 participants vs. the control
group. They did not perform statistical tests of significance but merely
stated raw numerical differences. The DoD analysts then went on to draw
conclusions about the success of Project 100,000, based solely on these
basic statistics. It is not known whether these differences in percentages
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were significant. Thus. the DoD findings should be used very cautiously
when Interpreting the data. There are a number of serious problems with
these data. which makes it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions
(Ramsberger and Means. 1987, p. 6).
One major problem was in the way the control groups were
chosen. When comparisons are performed between two groups, in order
to be able to draw meaningful conclusions, it is important that both
groups are matched as *equally* a.. ,sible. It is also important that
treatment within each group is the same (as possible). The criteria used
in the DoD study were not specific enough; the services were told that
the control groups should be selected so that the accessions could be
.ummed to represent a picture of the total accessions each quarter
(Heisey, et al., 1985. p. 11). As a result, the services' control groups vary
drastically in their make-up (Helsey. et al.. 1985, p. 11). For example, the
Navy control group was selected by choosing the first 700 accessions at
Naval Training Command (NTC) San Diego and NTC Great Lakes. regard-
less of AFQT, at the beginning month of the second quarter. The non-
Category IV individuals from this group served as a control group. The
Army control group was comprised of a 10-percent random sample of all
non-Project 100.000 accessions during each quarter. The Marine Corps
and Air Force also had a control group unique from each of the other
services. The DoD control group was a combination of these service
control groups. designed to represent non-Category IVs, and was not
matched to New Standards Men for education level, race, or gecgraplhic
region (Helsey. et al.. 1985. p. 12).
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The problem with comparing New Standards Men to the
DoD control group, then, is that the DoD (combined services) control
group was very different from the group of New Standards Men on a
number of dimensions that could confound the final results (Ramsberger
and Means. 1987. p. 7). For example, 76 percent of the DoD control
group were high-school graduates, whereas only 45 percent of the New
Standards Men graduated from high school (Ramsberger and Means,
1987, p. 7). It has already been established that non-high-school gradu-
ates have higher attrition rates. Therefore, it is possible that the higher
attrition rates for New Standards Men are a result of the higher number
of non-high-school graduates in this group (Ramsberger and Means,
1987, p. 7).
Another noted difficulty in comparing the target and control
groups is that the control group contains individuals from all AFQT
categories. The median AFQT score for the control group was 56.8, com-
pared with a median of 13.6 for the New Standards Men. This is to be
expected because the control group supposedly represents all other
accessions during that period; however, one might questior the compari-
son of all Category IVs to a group with a large number of those in the
highest AFQT categories. (Ramsberger and Means, 1987, p. 7)
Occupational specialty also was not controlled in the DoD
study. Attrition rates varied greatly across Jobs, and New Standards Men
and the control group tended to be assigned to different occupations, so
controlling for these differences might show larger New Standards Men
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control group differences in difficult jobs while showing smaller (or per-
haps no) differences in easyjobs. (Ramsberger and Means, 1987. p. 7)
Other differences across the services generate concerns
about the data. For example. the comparison of the New Standards Men
and the control group in formal skills training Is weakened by the fact
that the accession group and type of training differed among the services.
In the Army and Marine Corps, for example, all Project 100,000 partici-
pants received formal training, whereas in the Air Force only 70 percent
did, and in the Navy none did (all received on-the-Job training) (Helsey,
Means, and Laurence. 1985, p. 13). This skill-training attrition also var-
ied across the services because each service has a different type of pro-
gram. So. DoD-wide figures may mask substantial differences between
services and aptitude groups. This inconsistency in measurement leads
to problems not only in training completion but also in the performance
measures. Despite the problems with performance measures. though. it
appears that the New Standards Men performed acceptably (Heisey,
Means. and Laurence. 1985. p. 13).
The DoD study (1969) was conducted while Project 100,000
was still in progress; therefore, it included only data from 1966 through
1969 (Stlcht, et al., 1987, p. 38). So. since Project 100,000 occurred from
1966 through September 1971, the analysts did not view the complete
data set. which could result In misleading conclusions (Sticht, et al.,
1987, p. 38).
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b st/ha, Armn on• Bmcey, and Caylor (1987)
7tis study improved upon the DoD (1969) study described
above because researchers used the DoD final report of 1971, which
covers more t=an 340,000 personnel files (about 100.000 files more than
used In the earlier research). Nevertheless, the Sticht. et al. study still
retained som* of the same problems as observed in the DoD (1969) anal-
ysis. For ea mpge. there were control group inconsistencies, failure to use
powerful statlaucal procedures (such as multivarlate analysis), failure to
use tests of statistical significance, and no focus on differences in
training procedures between the services. Consequently. some of the
overall combined services rates may be somewhat misleading. However.
Sticht. et al. help overcome these inconsistencieo by pointing out the
differences across the services and providing possible reasons why these
differences exdst. In addition, since the authors are obviously strongly in
favor of a policy of recruiting disadvantaged youth, one may speculate
whether personal bias has intruded in their study.
c. Ramsberger and Means (1987)
Ramsberger and Means overcame many of the weaknesses
of the DoD (1969) study. These researchers attempted to reduce some
possible confounding variables by matching the New Standards Men
more closely with different subsets of the control group. Also, the two
groups were compared by occupations (using DDOCs) to again get a more
equal match between the target and control groups (Ramsberger and
Means, 1987, pp. 8 and 19). A major improvement in their method was
the application of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), even
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though their analyses used univarlate methods. MANOVA is a superior
method because It allows the ability to control for potentially confounding
variables, such as age, race. etc. (Ramsberger and Means. 1987. p. 10).
Ramsberger and Means probably had the most reliable results of the five
studies critiqued. However. they still urged the reader to use caution in
Interpreting their results due to confounding factors that are difficult to
analyze, even with MANOVA techniques. (This is further addressed in the
discussion of Research Question Three.)
d. eusse (1974)
Beusse did not explicitly disclose the statistical tests he
used. He did explain how he weighted the data, and it appears that he
used a t-test to compare means. (Since his hypothesis was that veterans
usually do something better than nonveterans, he should have used one-
tailed t-tests.)
One criticism of this study was that. although Beusse did
control for race, education at the time of enlistment, age. and geographic
location, the nonveteran sample was of slightly lower aptitude than the
veteran sample (Laurence, et al., 1989, p. 20). This criticism was coun-
tered in a letter by Thomas Sticht, who points out that, in order to show
income for groups of comparable aptitude, Beusse employed data for
veterans and nonveterans having AFQT percentile scores of 10, 11, 12,
and 13 (all which are very low) (Sticht, 1990, pp. 1-2). In three of these
four comparisons matched directly on AFQT scores, New Standards Men
were found to earn more than the nonveteran control group (Sticht,
1990. pp. 1-2).
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Two other criticisms deal with sources of possible bias.
First of all, Beuese restricted veterans to those with honorable dis-
charges; but "quitters," or those who were fired from jobs in the compari-
son group, were not omitted. Second. his survey completion rate for
whites was higher in the veteran group (Laurence. et al.. 1989. pp. 20-
21).
e. Laurence, Ranmberger, and Gribben (1989)
Laurence, et al. reported in great detail the complex weight-
ing method used on the data. T-tests and chi-square tests were per-
formed to compare averages between Project 100,000 participants and
the control group for a myriad of variables. There are mixed views as to
the accuracy of this 1989 study. As already mentioned, the study
received national attention. Regarding statistical methods, the
Washiunton Post reports:
The results were subjected to various statistical tests and weighted
to ensure that the sample groups accurately reflected the popula-
tions they represented....
Before the results were published, an official of the National
Center for Education Statistics, a federal agency, reviewed the
methodology and endorsed it....
W. S. Sellman, director of accession policy for the Defense
department and the official who requested the study, said that
although he expected the results to come out otherwise, he is
confident they are accurate. I'm satisfied that they did a fine job."
Sellman said. (McAllister, 1990)
Additional comments were supplied In an American Psychological Associ-
ation publication, the Montor.
Sellman endorses the HumRRO finding and had an outside statisti-
cian okay the results. However, the HumRRO findings are limited in
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that they are based on such a small sample of the Project 100.000
men. The researchers had a great deal of difficulty tracking the men
down. said Wayne Camara. who headed the project from 1986 to
1987 and is now with the American Psychological Association's Sci-
ence Directorate.
"The study probably would have come to similar conclusions
with a larger sample, but we don't really know what's different about
the people we couldn't find.* he said.
Laurence described other limitations of the study design in her
testimony. "Though the military and civilian samples were selected
from the same birth cohort and aptitude range, further demographic
and equivalerice was neither assumed nor expected," she wrote. "To
equate the Prolect 100.000 and NLS samples, a weighting scheme
was used to make the groups comparable on key demographic
dimensions- that is. education, race, geographic region and year of
birth." (Adler. 1990)
Thomas Sticht questioned the validity of the study in a
letter to the authors. One particular criticism related to the comparability
of the Project 100.000 sample and the National Longitudinal Survey
(NLS) control group. As Sticht observes:
... in your study you criticized Beusse's earlier study because his
comparison group was slightly lower in aptitude (less than 3 percen-
tile points) than the Project 100,000 group. Yet, in your own study.
there are no data presented on the comparability of the vet and non-
vet groups in aptitude. Further. your study says that because the
comparison group had not taken the AFgT, the comparison group
was constructed from "various tests" that happened to be in the data
base from the school files of the National Longitudinal Survey study
of 1966. The "various tests" were pooled and the results reported in
deciles and "individuals scoring from the 10th through the 29th per-
centiles were considered the aptitude-equivalents of participants in
Project 100,000." [p. 291 But you do not present means, medians,
distributions etc. of aptitude scores, nor do you indicate what the
"various tests" were. To my knowledge, most high schools do not
routinely administer "aptitude tests." except perhaps the SAT or
PSAT. But if the latter were used, then someone at the 20th percen-
tile on the AFQT. which is designed to be particularly useful for
Identifying lower aptitude youth. It seems to me to be a critical factor
to reveal the tests used to make your non-vet comparison group
comparable in terms of aptitude. This seems particularly important
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given your criticisms of Beusse's vet and non-vet comparisons. We
know from Ford Foundation-sponsored work that AF9T is correlated
with earnings In the NLS sample. Therefore, If the Project 100.000
vets and non-vets were not truly comparable in aptitude, then the
entire study is called Into question... (Sticht, 1990, p. 3)
Sticht further noted that the comparison group's socio-
economic status In 1966 was also not detailed, so It is not known
whether these two groups matched In this very critical area (Sticht, 1990,
p. 3). Sticht found other problems with the Laurence. et al. study, such
as the authors' conclusion regarding the credibility of answers given by
Project 100,000 to the researchers' questions. Laurence. et al. concluded
that since "objective data" did not support responses from nearly 50
percent of the Project 100,000 veterans who felt that their military expe-
rience had a positive effect on their subsequent careers, these veterans
could not possibly be correct In their "subjective" responses. T'[he authors
concluded:
... that it must be something of a phenomenon first described by
Aronson and Mills (1959). If one gives up a great deal or works very
hard to achieve a particular goal (in this case to serve successfully In
the military), then there must be positive aspects to, or outcomes
from, that experience. (Laurence, et al.. 1989, p. 118)
It seems odd that the other data collected (on Income, marital status.
etc.). which were similarly obtained by a verbal report. were never
doubted or questioned. The justification was that some data are "objec-
tire and other data are "subjective." However, since all data are self-
reported. in a sense all data are then equally objective or subjective.
(Sticht, 1990. p. 4)
It appears that there are several potential problems with
the Laurence. Ramsberger. and Gribben (1989) study. A positive aspect
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was that the researchers were extremely thorough: they examined the
data from "several angles." They tried to account for any confounding
factors one might question, and they controlled for several factors (such
as age) to see if there were any differences in the results. However, they
employed untwarate methods, which examine only one characteristic of
the population or sample at a time. More powerful multivariate methods,
which examine several characteristics of the population, or variables, and
the interactions or cortfr/nding effects of these variables, were not used.
Instead of using MANOVA. for example, they controlled for factors (such
as age) by omitting from the sample the observations they believed might
confound the results. Also, although they thoroughly compared the Proj-
ect 100,000 sample with the control group, their choice of a control
group Is suspect for the reasons noted in the preceding quotes. This
particular problem would place doubt on all of their results, even if their
methods were flawless.
D. SECONDARY RESEARCH ISSUE QUESTION TWO: CONFOUNDING
FACTORS
Problems with the experimental methods used in the five studies on
Project 100.000 are described in the section above. However, another
possible problem with these studies exists: even If one could scientifically
and accurately measure the performance and post-service experience of
the New Standards Men, and even if Project 100,000 were deemed to be a
"failure" by this measurement, can it be said that aptitude level
determines the ability of individuals to succeed in the military or In a
post-service civilian environment? Or could there be other reasons or
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causes for the results and conclusions found in the five studies examined
above? If so, then causality suggested in the five studies (i.e., aptitude as
the major driver for successful military service) must be carefully
questioned. Next is a discussion of possible confounding factors other
than aptitude level that may have contributed to the results reported in
the five Project 100,000 studies.
I. Timing of the Program
Project 100,000 took place during the Vietnam war. The results
of Project 100,000 were probably influenced by this factor, because the
war had a profound effect on morale (which contributes to performance)
and the attitudes of employers toward veterans (thus affecting post-
service earnings). Furthermore, although there is no consensus, some
studies have found that Vietnam veterans, regardless of aptitude level,
had problems in their post-service life. For example, in a New York Times
article, Weinraub reports:
Studies have shown that Vietnam veterans had difficulty in adjust-
ing to their post-service life. For example, one government-sponsored
study by the Center for Policy Research reported that more than 40
percent of Vietnam veterans had suffered from major emotional diffi-
culties, such as alcoholism and narcotics abuse, and that more than
75 percent complained of nightmares, marital discord, and job
problems... .At a 26 September 1979 news conference, Senator John
Heinz (R- Penn) stated, "These problems are a major reason that
over half of the returning from Vietnam did not resume their school-
ing, and have no doubt resulted in the unemployment of thousands
of Vietnam veterans.* (Weinraub, 1979, p. 16)
Along similar lines, the Los Angeles Times Service reports:
A later study, by the American Legion, found that of their members,
Vietnam veterans who were in heavy combat earned $3,000 less per
year than Vietnam-era veterans who served elsewhere. Since the
researchers believed that veterans who joined the American Legion
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were more "resociallzed," it could be that Vietnam combat veterans,
not included in this study. had an even larger earnings gap. (Los
Angeles Times Service. 1985, p. 1)
Because of the Vietnam war. it was difficult to give the New Standards
Men the assistance they needed to succeed. The strain of the war on the
military shifted attention and resources away from Project 100.000
(Laurence, et al.. 1989, pp. 18-19).
As stated by Ramsberger and Means:
The urgency of the Services' mission during Project 100,000 may
have brought about an environment less conducive to the success of
low-aptitude individuals. The opporttnities for training time. allowa-
ble time between enlistment and full preparedness, and so forth are
different in a combat context than in times of peace. Such differ-
ences may had a negative effect on individuals who needed more
time and/or attention to achieve their occupational goals. (Rams-
berger and Means, 1987. p. 97)
Another important element was the draft, which may have
affected the motivation of Project 100,000 participants. In fact, as of
1969, 47 percent of the New Standards Men were conscripted. (DoD.
1969. p. x)
2. Participant Profile and Aptitude Level
Ramsberger and Means found that the individuals (CAT IVs)
admitted during the ASVAB misnorming were not significantly different
from those of the lowest fully qualified service members at that time
(Ramsberger and Means, 1987. p. 95). The ASVAB misnorming CAT Ws
were also similar in attrition rates, promotion, and reenlistment eligibility
rates to the ASVAB misnorming control group (Ramsberger and Means,
1987, p. 95). As expected. non-high-school graduates had a higher attri-
tion rate and lower eligibility for promotion than did graduates. The dif-
ference between the Project 100.000 results and the ASVAB misnorming
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results was probably because the median AFQT percentile score for
Project 100.000 participants was 13.6 (more than half were In CAT IVC).
compared to the ASVAB misnorming population, which consisted mainly
of CATs IVA and IVB, with IVCs only admitted by the Army (Ramsberger
and Means. 1987, p. 96). The fact that the Project 100.000 population
was so "bottom heavy" could have contributed to all of the results found
in evaluations of the program.
3. MIltazy Leaders' Attitudes Toward Project 100,000
Project 100,000 was not well received by top military officials.
Although the program actually helped the country meet the manpower
demands of the Vietnam war and forestalled activation of reserves, it was
(and is still) not popular among many comma Aders. As Eitelberg
observes: -Today. military commanders recall ProjeL 100.000 with about
as much affection as the bubonic plague." (Eitelberg. 1988. p. 182) It was
feared that low-aptitude men would make disciplinary problems worse
and blur the image of the military as an "honorable service filled by men
of good character, of reasonable mentality and so on..." (Sticht. et al.,
1987, p. 37). Among cynics in the Pentagon, Project 100.000 was referred
to as "McNamara's Moron Corps" (Sticht, et al., 1987. p. 38). For what-
ever reason, the program has always had a poor reputation among many
insiders who feel that social experimentation and the military are
incompatible (Eitelberg. 1990, p. 16). Could this attitude have influenced
any experimental outcomes?
Were participants -tagged" for identification? There is a possibil-
ity that participants were identified by commanders, posing the question
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of whether there was prejudice applied in treatment of New Standards
Men which could bias results (Eitelberg. 1988. p. 180). Basklr and
Strauss claim that "commanding officers had little difficulty Identifying
Project 100,000 men, if only by their poor performance." They state that
at least one Army post "had a policy of not promoting them beyond the
rank of buck sergeant, no matter how good they were." (Eitelberg. 1988,
p. 180) As already mentioned, New Standards Men were supposed to
receive no special treatment. They also were not to be specially identified
(Eitelberg, 1988. p. 180). Although official records claim that participants
were not tagged for identification in any systematic manner, commanders
had access to all personnel records which contain identifyng Information
such as aptitude test scores, conditions of induction or enlistment, and
personal history. In addition. in the early years of Project 100,000. par-
ticipants had a two-digit Identifier attached to their service number- the
equivalent of a "scarlet letter." It Is unknown whether this "tagging"
actually led to discrimination toward the New Standards Men. However.
it is in conflict with the original plan. which sought to avoid a situation
for self-fulfilling failure (Eitelberg. 1988, p. 180).
A former Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara stated, *If
people are motivated properly and trained properly, they can succeed."
(Stlcht, et al., 1987, p. 188) The next two sections address whether Proj-
ect 100,000 provided these "tools* for success.
4. LeAdership and Motivation
Motivational theory was discussed in Chapter II. where it was
shown that performance is directly related to motivation. Military
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leadership is a great challenge, especially when those who are being led
are at a disadvantage (aptitude, educational, and/or social). Sometimes,
although the goal is clear to those in higher ranks, it is not communi-
cated to the middle, supervisory ranks who will be the ones to most often
interact with these personnel. The stresses in time of war or conflict com-
pound the problem, so again, the problem of timing (Vietnam era) arises.
It is thus possible that a failure of leadership, or a lack of understanding
of the special motivational needs of these low-aptitude personnel, could
have contributed significantly to their military performance and other
measured outcomes.
5. Accommodation
Accommodation strategies are described. Did Project 100,000
apply any or all of these strategies? Were they applied in a consistent
manner, ensuring that the New Standards Men would have the tools they
needed to succeed in military service? Would the application (or failure to
apply) of any or all of these strategies have affected the outcomes of the
five studies?
One of the goals of Project 100.000 was to help the participants
when they returned to the civilian Job market (through training and
experience). Most military enlisted Jobs have civilian counterparts, except
combat specialties (Heisey. et al., 1985, p. 15). Nevertheless, it appears
that the strategy of limited assignment (the easiest of the four strategies
to execute) was used; it is shown by the fact that about 86 percent of
New Standards Men were assigned to Just four of the nine DoD occupa-
tional areas (Sticht. et al.. 1987, p. 89). Since Project 100,000 occurred
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during the Vietnam war, there was a great need for men m the combat
occupational areas. This need, combined with the aptitude determination
in Job placement, resulted in a large concentration (about one-third) of
New Standards Men in the infantry and combat specialties (Sticht, et al.,
1987, p. 49). More specifically. 63 percent of the New Standards Men
were assigned to skills with civilian counterparts, compared with 70 per-
cent of the control group (Helsey. et al.. 1985, p. 15). This may have
affected results regarding attrition and performance, and it most likely
contributed to the resulks on post-service earnings as well, because per-
sons in combat-related jobs are less able to transfer skills to the civilian
Job market.
The training course revision strategy for Project 100,000 is diffi-
cult to measure. Although identification of the difficult parts of training
courses was attempted, there is little information on the number of
courses involved, how they were revised, and how they affected the men
who took the revised courses (Sticht. et al.. 1987, p. 89). However, even if
significant course revisions were made, since there was such a low per-
centage of New Standards Men who received any remedial training at all.
the number who would be significantly affected by these revisions would
be minor (Stlcht, et al., 1987. p. 89).
Literacy training was not originally proposed as part of Project
100,000 because of the resistance on the part of Congress to include the
military as part of President Johnson's Great Society programs (Sticht, et
al., 1987, p. 89). Despite this resistance, all of the services implemented
such training early in the program. However, contrary to recommenda-
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tions. this training was not integrated into Job-skills courses, and it was
not offered in off-duty time. Furthermore. only about 12 percent of Proj-
ect 100.000 participants received remedial literacy training (Sticht, et al.,
1987, p. 89). Therefore, one might wonder if the experimental outcomes
would have been different if there had been an organized and consistent
accommodation strategy applied to address the special needs of low-
aptitude recruits.
8. Reenlistments and Test Requirements
It is interesting to note that, although only a small percentage of
Project 100,000 participants actually reenlisted, fully 25 percent of the
Project 100,000 men indicated they would have reenlisted had they
qualified (DoD, 1969, p. xxiv). In order to qualify, they would have had to
pass additional aptitude tests. One may well ask, then: If training and
guidance were available which mighty have enabled them to pass these
tests, would the outcome for the reenlistment rates have been different?
7. Definition of Atition
The statistics shown In Stage One on attrition should be inter-
preted carefully, because the definition Is not confined to cases of unsuit-
ability, unfitness, and misconduct. For example, about one-third of these
separations were due to preexisting medical problems. battlefield death,
dependency and hardship charges, and stmilar causes (Helsey, Means.
and Laurence, 1985. p. 19: also see Sticht, et al., 1987, p. 52). The
remaining one-third were early separations for poor performance or
unsatisfactory behavior (Sticht, et al., 1987, p. 52). Since more New
Standards Men were assigned to combat, it follows that more would die
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in battle. Less than half of the attrition cases DoD- wide were for reasons
of unsuitability, un.fitness. and misconduct (Heisey. Means. and Lau-
rence, 1985, p. 19). Furthermore, attrition rates varied widely between
the services. For example, the Army had the highest number of New
Standards Men (65 percent of them), but it also had the lowest attrition
rate (12 percent) (Helsey, Means, and Laurence, 1985, p. 19; also see
Sticht, et al., 1987, pp. 50-5 1). While the exact cause in not known, It is
probably due to differing policies and conditions. For example, the Army
and Marine Corps had a large number of ground troops in Vietnam.
Attrition for New Standards Men was three times higher in the Marines
than in the Army, suggesting the policy and practices of the Marine
Corps toward New Standards Men was different than in the other
services. (Sticht. et al., 1987. pp. 50-51).
6. Formal Skills Training vs. OJT and Promotion Rates
Each of the services differed in the type of skills training the
New Standards Men received. Could these differences have affected any
experimental outcomes, especially in promotion rates? In the DoD (1969)
studies which compared promotion rates, it was noted that, in the Navy,
there was a larger gap between New Standards Men and the control
group. This larger gap was attributed to the Navy's participants receiving
on-the-Job training instead of formal school training, thus lengthening
the time to qualify for promotion. Nevertheless, the DoD study found
that, overall, the New Standards Men were being promoted on schedule
(Helsey, et al., 1985. p. 16). However. in the study by Sticht. et al., it was
found that the New Standards Men were promoted at a slower rate, with
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great differences between the services. The Air Force and Navy had the
slowest rate of advancement. The researchers noted that this was prob-
ably because these two services rely heavily on written testing as a
means for advancement (Sticht, et al., 1987. p. 52). The differences
between the services could also be misleading because each service had a
different control group composition, as previously described.
9. Transition to Civilian Life Assistance
Project Transition was a program intended to provide counsel-
ing, education, or vocational training to aid Project 100,000 men and
other Vietnam-era personnel in their return to civilian life (Heisey.
Meais, and Laurence. 1985. p. 16). This program was limited, however;
it was voluntary and not available at all military installations (Heisey.
Means, and Laurence, 1985, p. 16). It was not conducted overseas, which
is important. because Vietnam returnees were often already separated
from active duty when they arrived In the U.S.: thus. Project Transition
would not be available.to them (Heisey, Means. and Laurence. 1985.
p. 16). Project Transition also failed because many of the draftees
received *early outs," which did not give them time to take advantage of
the program. The principal users of the program turned out to be retiring
careerists. Only six percent of Army Project 100.000 participants actually
received assistance through Project Transition.
I
A psychologist and director for accession policy in the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel
has noted that the military provided counseling, vocational training
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courses, or additional education as the men were preparing to leave, but
added:
"Unfortunately, this program was rather limited in its availability.
and it was only voluntary.* Furthermore, he noted that the project
set up to help the New Standards Men prepare for civilian life "never
quite got off the ground to the extent that it should have...The
military did let these guys down." (Adler, 1990)
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMNDATIONS
A. CONCLUSION
1. Primary Research Questions One and Two: Does the Mili-
tary. the Individual. or Socitay Benefit by the Recruitment
of Disadvantaged Youth?
Based on the case study of Project 100.000 (Chapters III and
IV)./t can be concluded that the military definitely benefited from Project
100.000 from the standpoint of quantity requirements (DoD, 1969.
p. xxvl). As far as benefiting from the performance of the New Standards
Men, however, it appears that the debate has not been resolved. There
seems to be a consensus that the low-aptitude youth did not perform as
well as those with higher aptitude test scores. Yet. the question remains:
was their performance level acceptable to the services? As Eitelberg
notes: "It Is probably safe to say that. from the standpoint of 'military
effectiveness* or 'readiness.' the Jury Is still out on...ProJect 100.000.0
(EItelberg. 1988. p. 182) Whether the individual and society benefited
also cannot be answered definitely, since research has thus far exhibited
conflicting results. For example. Beusse concluded that Project 100.000
was a success, whereas the study by Laurence. Ramsberger. and Grib-
ben found Just the opposite.
2. Secondary Research Issues-Question One: Has Research.
Which Measures the Benefits and Detriments of Disadvan-
taged Youth in the Military. Been Adequate to Draw a Defin-
itive Conclusion Regarding an Accession Policy? Were the
Methods Under Sufficient Control to Utilize Any Data as
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Conclusive Evidence? Were the Methods Flawed in Any
Critical Way that Might Provide Misleading Conclusions?
As illustrated in Chapter IV, it can be seen that there were sev-
eral weaknesses in the experimental methods of the five major studies of
Project 100,000. This suggests that caution be used In interpreting the
results and conclusions of previous research on the effects or value of
Project 100.000- and that these results not be used in formulating
future policy regarding the enlistment of disadvantaged youth.
& Secondary Research Issues-Question Two: Causality: If
Research Finds that Recruiting Disadvantaged Youth for
Military Service Benefits Neither the Armed Forces Nor the
Individual, Can One Conclude that this Negative Result is
Due to the Failure of Disadvantaged Youth. or Could it be
Due to Other Factors. Such as Insufficient Training?
Measurement of qualitative data is a very difficult task, indeed.
The researchers used widely accepted measures, such as supervisory
ratings, as one measure of performance and Income and educational
attainment as two measures of individual benefits. The research, how-
ever, was based on the assumption that the military system offers an
adequate environment, able to give disadvantaged or low-aptitude
recruits a fair chance for success. The discussion in Chapters II and IV
points out that this assumption may not have been completely correct;
that Is, there may have been oome weaknesses in the system that hin-
dered success, as measured by the standard variables. This raises some
serious questions concerning causality. It also brings to mind Peter
Drucker's distinction between effectiveness, or doing the right things.
and efficiency, or doing things right (Stoner and Freeman. 1989, p. 139).
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Could it be that Project 100,000 was "the right thing to do" but that it
wasn't "done right"? There is enough evidence to suggest that this is the
case.
B. RECOMNDATXONS
In light of the conclusions above, the force drawdown in the 1990s.
and the demand for a high-quality military force, should the military
have a manpower policy of recruiting a certain proportion of its force
from disadvantaged youth?
Based on the conflicting opinions and studies of Project 100.000 and
all of the problems associated with previous research, an unqualified
"yes" or "no" recommendation cannot be made. However. since history
has shown that disadvantaged youth are usually recruited when the
demand for military manpower heightens, and because the plight of dis-
advantaged youth is of Important concern to society in the coming
decade and beyond, the subject, to borrow a phrase from Sticht, et al.,
should not be "cast off." If the military needs to recruit disadvantaged
youth in the future, it would be in its best interest to be practiced in
training, assigning, leading, and motivating these personnel so that they
can perform up to the required standards. As discussed in Chapter II,
military manpower policy decisions are very complex, and although the
trend has been toward a higher-quality force, based on military concerns,




It is suggested that another "experiment," on a much smaller
scale, be conducted that would allow a specified number of disadvan-
taged youth to serve in the military. This new experiment, however,
should be managed with the "lessons learned" from Project 100,000 in
mind, that is. avoiding the weaknesses of the past and adding new wis-
"* dom learned through manpower policies since Project 100,000. In addi-
tion, specific guidelines should be set up to enhance the research process
(again, learning from the errors of Project 100,000) to minimize bias and
other experimental weaknesses. A new program could be instituted on an
experimental basis to assess the merits of incorpokating larger numbers
of disadvantaged youth within the military. Some specific actions con-
cerning the design of this experiment are presented below.
a. Attitude
Since there was a negative attitude toward Project 100,000
among many military commanders (see Chapter I1), the new program
could be promoted from a positive standpoint from the begInning, start-
ing with its name. For example. the program could be called "Upward
Bound."
b. Recruitment qf Youth Who Are Low-Income as Well as
Lxu-Aptitude
A sample of disadvantaged youth could be Initially
recruited for the experimental program. These recruits would have to
meet both criteria of the definition of "disadvantaged youth"- that Is.
they would not only be of low aptitude, Category IV, but would also come
from low-income families. This Is in contrast to Project 100,000 which, as
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described in Chapter 111, used only aptitude criteria. Based on the ASVAB
mlsnorming study by Ramsberger and Means, it is also suggested that
the participants be chosen so that most are in the "higher" Category IV
range, with the majority drawn from Category IVA rather than the
"bottom heavy" Project 100,000 population of CAT IVCs. (According to
Ramsberger and Means, the performance of "higher Category-IV range
personnel was not significantly different from the performance of those in
Category I1IB.) Participants would need to be identified in the sense that
they must get the extra help they require (remedial training. etc.). but
they should not be "tagged" in a negative way so that their commands
would be opposed to their assignment and treat them less well than they
treat other personnel.
c. Peacetme Program
This program should not be implemented during a period of
war or large-scale deployment (such as Project 100,000 during the Viet-
nam conflict). There are several reasons for having the program during a
time of relative peace. One reason is the equity Issue. Since it is expected
that disadvantaged youth will be heavily recruited anyway in times of
war. it would seem insincere and highly suspicious to claim that this is a
program of great opportunity for them. especially when it can be shown
that the doors to military service are usually shut after the fighting is
over. Having a program in peacetime indicates a more honest commit-
ment to disadvantaged youth. Another reason is that, during war, DoD is
faced with the added strain of a major mobilization and is not prepared
to "try out" special programs for the disadvantaged. In addition, the
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training pipeline would be overloaded and would not need added pres-
sure. Furthermore, one of the purposes of this suggestion is that, since it
is probably inevitable tb•:t disadvantaged youth will be called in a major
mobilization, "learning to do this right in peacetime should pay divi-
dends when the nation is faced with war.
d. Managmenmt Support
The program would require positive support from top man-
agement, which would then be communicated to lower levels, so that
positive support (not resistance) would be assured down through local
command levels.
e. Leadership/Motivation
Chapter II included a discussion about the importance of
leadership and motivation as well as a list of some recommendations for
leaders by Steers and Porter. One of those recommendations is that lead-
ers should recognize that their subordinates have different levels of skills
and abilities, therefore requiring different motivational techniques. It is
suggested that leadership training be provided to supervisors who might
be responsible for the performance of "Upward Bound" participants to
increase the supervisors' awareness of the special needs of low-aptitude
personnel. This training would pay off in other areas, too, making leaders
more adept at Job motivation techniques for personnel of any AFgT cate-
gory who are assigned to low-skill Jobs. It is a challenge to supervise per-
sons in low-skilled, "dead end" Jobs, no matter what the quality of the
individual. Training leaders to instill a sincere feeling of Job- and
self-importance in those workers can make a major difference in
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performance and retention, so there are positive "spillover effects" from
this training.
Outside of job performance. supervisors should be
reminded of personal and olife skills" needs such as nutrition, check-
book-balancing, family budgeting, and family responsibilities. Although
service members are generally aware that these counselling services are
already in place (such as through The Navy Relief Society or Family Ser-
vices), supervisors often assume that people get this training at home.
not realizing that some people, from poor, uneducated parents, do not
have this b-neflt. Sensitizing supervisors to special needs of subordinates
improves the leaders as well as the service members they help.
f. Accommodation Strategies
(1) Job Assignments. The Ramsberger and Means study
on the ASVAB misnormh-.g (see Chapters II and IV)Illustrates the impor-
tant link between Job assignment, motivation, and performance level. Fu-
ther research is suggested to find productive ways to assign Jobs to dis-
advantaged youth. For example, if disadvantaged youth are sent to low-
skilled occupations, could Job rotation make their work less repetitive
and boring? Are there Job upgrades that can be given to those who per-
form well, to serve as an incentive for performance? In other words, are
there "Job tracks" where low-aptitude individuals can advance through
low- or medium-skilled jobs to motivate them to perform well and to help
them grow? Programs such as JOBS, which allow admittance to tech-
nical schools. should be evaluated ae an integral part of occupational
assignment: if some participants qualify, and JOBS is determined to be a
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successful means for placing low-aptitude personnel in technical ratings,
then it can be part of the program.
(2) Training. There has been extensive research in the
area of military training. Experts in the field should analyze and recom-
mend the best remedial training programs, including types of courses.
course length. and when in the program to conduct training. A cost-
benefit analysis should be conducted on the trade-off between the added
costs of training and the "pay-off" in performance when using low-
aptitude accessions.
g. Transition to Civilian Life Assistance
As described earlier, Project Transition was intended to
help New Standards Men and others in their transition to civilian life, but
it was only available to a minority of these men. It is suggested that vet-
erans' agencies be included in the planning and execution of any new
experiment to recruit disadvantaged youth so that assistance can be
available when the participants are ready to return to civilian life.
h. Experimental Methods
This experiment would strive to use replicable and clearly
defined methodology. For example, all services should follow the same
specific guidelines for obtaining closely matched control groups. It is also
strongly suggested that multiple regression techniques be applied in
analysis of program results because these techniques are powerful in




Since the ASVAB misnorming was somewhat of an improvement
in certain areas over Project 100.000 (during peacetime. participants
were not identified in a negative way). the data already available could be
studied further, using improved experimental techniques. This alterna-
tive would be a lot less costly than the new experiment proposed as Alter-
native One. Some research has already been done on the ASVAB mis-
norming and the performance of the individuals involved. For example.
Ramsberger and Means (1987) compared the "potentially ineligible* group
performance with the lowest fully qualified service members at that time.
"In terms of attrition, promotion, reenlistment eligibility, the IASVAB
misnorming personnel] were very similar to the control groups." (Rams-
berger and Means, 1987. p. 95) The more recent study by Laurence,
Ramsberger and Gribben (1989) examined the post-service lives of those
admitted to military service as a result of the ASVAB misnorming.
Some of the Project 100,000 shortcomings were corrected in the
ASVAB misnorming studies, but some remained. For example. ASVAB
misnorming participants were not provided with remedial training
because they were not Identified as needing it, but this remedial training
could have affected their performance. Following this scenario to a con-
clusion, if ASVAB misnorming participants were inadequately prepared
for a job, they may have lost self-confidence and the motivation to better
themselves and achieve upward mobility. Ironically, the lack of identifi-
cation is a cruel, double-edged sword. A properly planned program
should avoid tagging disadvantaged youth in a negative way that could
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encourage prejudicial treatment. For low-aptitude recruits, remedial
training could be provided at boot camp. Additional help at this point in
their career provides three benefits: (1) it increases low-aptitude recruits'
ability to complete boot camp. (2) it relieves field commanders from the
b,uren of providing remedial training, and (3) it serves as an equalizer,
enabling low-aptitude recruits to drop the low-aptitude stigma upon
completion of boot camp.
IU Alternative 2 were chosen, it would be an improvement over
the Project 100.000 case study. but there would still be doubt and many
unanswered questions.
C. SUMMARY
As shown In Chapters I and I1, there is evidence (assuming peace-
time status) that the military force will be smaller in size and staffed, for
the most part. with high-aptitude personnel. This situation could create
entry barriers to disadvantaged youth who have historically turned to the
military for social mobility. As discussed in Chapter II, military man-
power policy decision makers must carefully consider not only the role
the military plays in national security but also its role as one of the
nation's largest employers.
The military establishment pushes to recruit disadvantaged youth
during wartime, and historically the disadvantaged have been called
upon to shoulder a disproportionate share of the defense burden. The
social Issues discussed here focus on the peacetime benefits of military
service for these same disadvantaged youth, best summed up by the
quote used in Chapter I by Sticht: "It should not be forgotten that when
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military resources are used to help the disadvantaged overcome" their
social plight, "we get triple-duty dollars: the individual finds upward
mobility, the military gets needed manpower, and the nation accom-
plishes n valuable social welfare activityl" (Sticht, 1990, p. 4) The
national security debate about recruiting disadvantaged youth for mili-
tary service generally centers around technology and the quality of per-
sonnel required to effectively operate and maintain weapon systems. A
military manpower policy of recruiting disadvantaged youth must evalu-
ate the costs and benefits for the military, the individual, and society.
This analysis has attempted to provide objective evidence regarding
these costs and benefits based on the Project 100.000 experiment.
Although five major studies on Project 100,000 were analyzed, no conclu-
sions could be reached because there were contradictory findings,
weaknesses in research methods, and problems with the program that
could have adversely affected research outcomes. Nevertheless. military
manpower policies for recruiting disadvantaged youth in times of peace
as well as war truly reveal how the nation's leaders care for society's less
fortunate members. And because these policies exercise a lasting effect
on the lives of the individuals involved and the nation as a whole, they
should be assessed with no less than the most definitive and objective
methodology that science can offer.
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